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Shakespeare and the City: The Negotiation of Urban Spaces in Shakespeare’s Plays

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INTRODUCTION

BY

CHRISTINA WALD AND FELIX SPRANG

Shakespeare and the City:
The Negotiation of Urban Spaces in Shakespeare’s Plays

Shakespeare’s plays were conceived and first performed in a political, cultural and economic metropolis, London around 1600, which drew audiences from different social spheres and countries to its theatres. While England was foremost a rural country, London radiated a climate of social change that was negotiated in theatrical presentations of the city, often evoking a non-civilised, barbaric, or utopian other. Our seminar aims at tracing the negotiation of urban spaces on the early modern stage, in contemporary theatrical productions and film adaptations. Which influences did London around 1600 exert on Shakespeare’s plays, and in how far can non-English settings of the plays tell us something about early modern notions of these cities and countries? In how far did the presentation of urban life in Shakespeare's plays contribute to the self-fashioning of Londoners (and other citizens) in his time and perhaps even today? Which topographies of the city (and its other – the countryside, the forest, the island) do Shakespeare’s plays present and how do they relate to cultural, social and economic concerns? How do the plays enact the demarcation and intersection of public and private spaces? How are spaces gendered? Which allegorical conceptions of the city can we trace?

The contributions to this volume address these questions. Galena Hashhozheva investigates the juxtaposition of wilderness and civilization in *Timon of Athens* and points to fundamental dichotomies in Western philosophy. She illustrates that Shakespeare’s play exposes the urban roots of Western philosophy shaped, consequently, by architectural mind-sets and civic mentalities. Yvonne Zips looks at similarities between ideas expressed by the *Situationist* movement and representations of the city in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and *As You Like It* arguing that Shakespeare viewed the city as a theatre of action. Martin Moraw scrutinizes the function of the discovery space in *Hoffman* and *The Maid’s Tragedy*. He argues that both plays make use of discovery to underpin a “theologico-political grammar of sovereign authority” allowing for the sovereign to appear unexpectedly to reinstall order. Sarah Dustagheer compares representations of the city in plays performed at the Globe and Blackfriars and argues that the respective repertoires construe different perspectives on London: it was viewed as a map (at the Blackfriars) or as a panorama (at the Globe).
TIMON’S ATHENS AND THE WILDERNESS OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

GALENA HASHHOZHEVA

Within the Shakespeare corpus, Timon of Athens is one among a handful of plays that blazon names of cities in their titles. Athens merits this mention since it functions as both a dramatic setting and a metonym for the local society and its mores. Yet the city’s titular prominence does not betoken a compliment, for Athens is a whore that breeds thieves, traitors, gluttons, and parasites. Timon’s Athens possesses few redeeming features, in contradistinction to other, more complex cities in Shakespearean drama, such as a Venice that balances contractual obligation, legalism, and mercy with the help of Christian wit (The Merchant of Venice), or an impassioned Verona where love and a blood feud embrace (Romeo and Juliet). The imperfect city in Timon of Athens is confronted by philosophy, a rigorous judge and an all-permeating presence in this cold, cerebral play.¹ Timon of Athens features a professional philosopher, Apemantus of the Cynic school, among its dramatis personae, while the protagonist Timon professes misanthropy, a near kin of Cynicism. With these two philosopher figures dominating the play, the city is destined to suffer a radical critique and transvaluation. This corresponds to historical realities in antique Athens, whose wise men – men prone to critical interrogation and a Socratic defiance of received beliefs and customs – considered the polis to be one of their most intriguing philosophical subjects.

Put in a broader perspective, Timon of Athens reminds us of the origins of European philosophy as a pointedly urban phenomenon. From Diogenes’ feat of urinating in the agora before the eyes of Athens to Benjamin’s fascination with Parisian flânerie, Western thinking has learnt to thrive on the fruitful soil of the city. Even city-refugees such as Heidegger could not resist the intellectual challenges that the urban environment unceasingly generates. And so the sylvan philosopher of the Black Forest sometimes wrote with a view specifically to the city, giving us a fine philosophical critique of modern technology and a pioneering profession of ecological Sorge (care, concern).

¹ For a philosophical critique of the city and urban society in the play, see Robert Miola’s “Timon in Shakespeare’s Athens.” Miola argues (as have others before him, although in a less systematic manner) that the play demonstrates Shakespeare’s “response to Greek political philosophy and the idea of the polis,” especially the idea of historical Athens as an example of a democratically – that is to say, “chaotic[ally,] vicious[ly]” – governed polis (22). Miola uses facts from Athenian history and concepts from treatises of Greek political philosophy as scalpels with which to anatomize the corrupt mores in Shakespeare’s Athens. Yet, he does not pay sufficient attention to the dramatization of philosophy itself in this city play on the levels of plot, character, and rhetoric. In my analysis, philosophy critiques the city not from a meta-plane but from the middle of the dramatic action. This position makes philosophy vulnerable, and soon it must itself undergo trials and criticisms pitched against it by the city and its other, the wilderness.
The forest, a locus where a human being’s over-determined relationship to the city can be reconsidered, dominates the second half of *Timon of Athens*. Following his financial ruin, Timon voluntarily flees Athens and chooses the wilderness as cradle for his new misanthropic worldview, which germinated in the moral miasma of the city just before he left it. Up to this moment, philosophy in *Timon of Athens* has been represented solely by Apemantus’ Cynicism, a creed unmatched in its censorious verdicts of its urban milieu. Timon’s misanthropy, however, complicates the depiction of philosophy in the play by venturing out beyond the limits of the city. In the wilderness, philosophy, until now judge, will itself undergo an ordeal: the city and the wilderness, nature and culture will unite to try philosophy, its sense of place, and its situatedness in the world.

The first condemnation of Athens in the play accompanies the entrance of Apemantus, the “churlish philosopher,” at a rich feast in Timon’s house. The setting of the opening scene is representative of the whole first half of the play, which takes place mostly in urban interiors teeming with domestic comforts and echoing with the whispers of busybodies and parasites. As the guests at Timon’s banquet are gathered gossiping, Apemantus swoops down on them and instead of greeting them, insinuates that they are dishonest knaves simply because they live in Athens:

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TIMON.        Why dost thou call them knaves? Thou know’st them not.
APEMANTUS.   Are they not Athenians?
TIMON.        Yes.
APEMANTUS.   Then I repent not.    (1.1.186-189)
```

Apemantus’ snarling speeches and offensive behaviour throughout the play echo well-known legends about Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of classical Cynicism. The railing against Athens in particular is a signal philosophical reflex that Apemantus has inherited from antiquity, as have a number of other Cynic characters in Renaissance literature. In the comedy *Alexander and Campaspe*, for instance, Lyly’s Diogenes makes accusations no less collective or categorical than those of Apemantus: “Indeed I think the Athenians have their children ready for any vice, because they be Athenians” (Lyly 4.1.78-79). The Cynicism of the historical Diogenes was, among other things, a philosophy of anti-urbanism, anti-patriotism, and apoliticism – a reaction against a civilization that was reaching the apex of its refinement and beginning to turn in upon itself. Yet precisely because he purposed to criticise the city vigorously and effectively, a Cynic had to circulate within its bounds: he could not but become an eminently urban figure. Although Diogenes scorned civil housing and found an ascetic shelter in his infamous tub – the “zero-point of architecture” (Sloterdijk 312) –, his tub, we must note, neighboured the Athenian mansions. Similarly, while Socrates prided himself on his poverty and modesty of needs, which he shared with the Cynics, he frequented the homes of wealthy symposiarchs, as does Apemantus. Apemantus, Diogenes, and Socrates all live actively in the very heart of urban society, from which strategic point they also dispatch their criticism of its vices and their aggressive counsel towards its moral improvement. They practise an equilibristic art of

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2 On the cultural psychology of the Cynic as an urban figure, see Sloterdijk 34-35 and 309-310.
involvement and non-involvement that allows them to belong to Athens without being entirely assimilated.

Apemantus’ reluctance to participate as others do in social occasions and, indeed, to move as others move in social space is especially visible in Shakespeare’s dramatic medium. In 1.1 the vocational philosopher makes a point of arriving late at Timon’s feast, after the representatives of most other guilds (Poet, Painter, Jeweller, Merchant) have already gathered. In 1.2, when the food is served and everyone proceeds with much pomp to the tables, a colourful stage direction reads, “Then comes, dropping after all, Apemantus, discontentedly, like himself.” According to Robert Weimann, this defiant action produces a “meaningful gap in space and time [...]”. Apemantus, ‘dropping after all,’ breaks up unity both in the timing of the entrance and in the representation of social status and manners” (205). Even as the others have taken their seats, Apemantus continues to toy with his undecided role, which lies halfway between a proper guest and a disruptive persona non grata:

TIMON. O, Apemantus! You are welcome.
APEMANTUS. No, You shall not make me welcome.
I come to have thee thrust me out of doors.

TIMON. Fie, thou’rt a churl. Ye’ve got a humour there
Does not become a man; ‘tis much to blame [...] Go, let him have a table by himself,
For he does neither affect company
Nor is he fit for’t, indeed.

APEMANTUS. Let me stay at thine apperil, Timon.
I come to observe, I give thee warning on’t.

TIMON. I take no heed of thee; thou’rt an Athenian,
Therefore welcome. (1.2.22-35)

The philosopher shows himself resistant to mollycoddling with kind phrases. For him, to be welcome could only be a matter of being made welcome, but this his independent spirit would not stomach: “You shall not make me welcome.” While he cannot be forced into anything, Apemantus apparently can induce in others such reactions as may suit his whim. With his retort “I come to have thee thrust me out of doors,” for instance, Apemantus presumes to control the passions and actions of Timon, his host and superior. Apemantus augments his positional ambivalence in every way he can,

3 Northrop Frye describes socially alienated characters in Timon of Athens (98-100) and other relevant plays (93-97) under the heading of the ἴδιοτής. The term ἴδιοτής is particularly appropriate to Timon of Athens since it had a historically specific use during Athens’ classical democratic era: an ἴδιοτής was a withdrawn self-centred person (from idios, “private”), who refused to participate in public affairs and was for this reason reviled by the rest of society. A masterful use of this anti-social type for the purposes of drama we may find in many works by Lucian of Samosata, including his comic dialogue Timon, or the Misanthrope, which is among the possible sources of Shakespeare’s play. According to Frye, in Shakespearean comedy, the ἴδιοτής is a structural position that may be occupied by a variety of character types (such as the villain, the scapegoat, the gull, the senex iratus, etc.) theorized by Frye and others. In tragedy, “the hero is always something of an ἴδιοτής, isolated from the society in which he has his being” (Frye 98).
shilly-shallying between wanting to “observe” and wanting to be expelled, between the house and the street, and between the whole party and a separate table. Timon, however, tries to collapse Apemantus’ ambivalence: “thou’rt an Athenian, / Therefore welcome.” This dignified laconic statement inverts Apemantus’ earlier insinuation that all guests at the feast are knaves because they are Athenians (1.1.187-189). Apemantus’ due revenge for Timon’s attempt to number him among the citizens is a most anti-social and unappetising speech on cannibalism. According to Apemantus, the too-welcoming Timon has gathered banqueters who lust to dine not with him but rather on him (1.2.37-50).

In the dense fabric of urban households, Apemantus appears to be an undomesticated isolate. He does, however, possess if not a home, then at least a space of his own, which is none the less real for being entirely verbal, built of the Cynic’s rocky and jagged rhetoric. Even in the middle of the foolish city, Apemantus can create and maintain this alternative space of wisdom from which he can access and attack society while remaining inaccessible himself. Apemantus calls his philosophical bastion a “heaven” (1.2.245) and will share it with others whom he deems worthy of, or in need of, its benefits. Timon, a good man but devoid of practical reason, qualifies to be inducted into the Cynic “heaven.” Timon’s love of society, however, gets in the way of his inclusion, for Apemantus’ “heaven” is full of dire railings against society. Timon won’t listen to such anti-social opprobrium and is consequently locked out of the “heaven” of sound counsel:

APEMANTUS. Thou giv’st so long, Timon, I fear me thou wilt give away thyself in paper shortly. What needs these feasts, pomps, and vainglories?

TIMON. Nay, an you begin to rail on society once, I am sworn not to give regard to you.

Farewell, and come with better music.

APEMANTUS. So. Thou wilt not hear me now, thou shalt not then. I’ll lock thy heaven from thee.

O, that men’s ears should be
To counsel deaf, but not to flattery! (1.2.238-246)

This heaven is not the only place from which Timon will be banished during the headlong course of his fall. As soon as the rumour about his bankruptcy spreads, it becomes impossible for him to move freely or to occupy securely any given space, interior or exterior, within Athens. Timon’s folly locks him out even from the peace and comfort of his home, over which he no longer holds mastery. Previously, the house had been a temple dedicated to godlike bounty, and he its host and high priest. The house embraced numerous guests and orchestrated them, under Timon’s lead, into the consummate form of an Athenian symposium with its select society of artists, generals, merchants, senators, philosophers, and hetaeras (the masque’s Amazons at 1.2.109-149). Now, by contrast, rude servants of these same guests throng the halls and passages of the house to demand, on behalf of their masters, that Timon repay his loans. The servants’ scramble renders the house untraversable and disorganized, whereas previously the ceremonious movements and the dance of their masters at the feast had made it seem orderly and elegant, animated with an insincere cosmic harmony. In their desire to gain access to Timon and his private chambers, the zealous
servants block the very doors through which Timon, rushing to the sudden din, is trying to enter. Significantly, Timon’s first wrathful outburst in the play is an expression of his painful sense of reduced existential space:

TIMON.  What, are my doors opposed against my passage?
Have I been ever free, and must my house
Be my retentive enemy, my jail?
The place which I have feasted, does it now,
Like all mankind, show me an iron heart? (3.4.79-83)

Besieged and set astir by the intruders, the house turns against its master and becomes, along with all Athenians, an “enemy.” The reproach that Timon levels against his house adds a singular accent to Samuel Johnson’s designation of the play as a “domestick tragedy” (455). While in Othello and other plays that may be said to exemplify this putative genre, the characters suffer from what happens in their households, Timon blames it were the house itself. Like the swooning Othello, Timon grows weak and physically nauseated and suffocated in the middle of his home filled with oppressors: “They have e’en put my breath from me, the slaves. Creditors? Devils!” (3.5.1-2).

Inflamed by hate, Timon conceives a plan to humiliate the creditors: he will treat them to the same inhospitable disorder that their servants unleashed in his house. Timon invites his regular guests for one last feast, which begins with solemn music and urbane curtseys but degenerates to a bedlam of grotesque curses, flying stones, and lukewarm water thrown in the guests’ faces. In their ensuing flight, amid Timon’s sardonic shouts “What, all in motion?” (3.7.94), the creditors hurry so much that they leave behind a litter of caps and gowns. They have thereby literally enacted the cavalier comment that their servants made after Timon’s earlier fit of rage: “our masters may throw their caps at their money. These debts may well be called desperate ones, for a madman owes ’em” (3.4.97-99).

Having used his house as an accomplice in this vengeance, Timon has done with it and curses it too, for the house is a hateful reminder of a past that deserves obliteration: “Burn house!” (3.7.96). This execration is succeeded by “Sink Athens!” (3.7.96) as Timon moves from interior to exterior space and makes the entire city a stage for his discontent. He rages in particular against architecture, one of the renowned embodiments of Athenian civilisation. Timon attempts to “unbuild[...] the city in a rhetoric of destruction” (Paster 102):

TIMON.  Let me look back upon thee. O thou wall
That girdles in those wolves, dive in the earth,
And fence not Athens! [...]  

He tears off his clothing.

Nothing I’ll bear from thee
But nakedness, thou detestable town;
Take thou that too, with multiplying bans.
Timon will to the woods, where he shall find
Th’unkindest beast more kinder than mankind.
The gods confound – hear me you good gods all –
Th’Athenians, both within and out that wall;
And grant, as Timon grows, his hate may grow
To the whole race of mankind, high and low.
Amen.     (4.1.1-41)

Timon’s naked departure from the city inverts the Athenians’ fussiness about their clothing and similar attributes, which from signs of culture have devolved into signs of cultural decadence. While hurrying to escape from Timon’s travestied feast of stones, the creditors had abandoned cloaks, hats, and various bejewelled raiments and afterwards harped on about them in pathetic regret, wishing that they could retrieve them (3.7.99-105). Set against the creditors’ ridiculous attachment to such trivia, Timon’s gesture of tearing his clothes acquires an unexpected air of dignity. Stripped of the protective layers of clothing and housing and divested of his citizenship, Timon betakes himself to the wilderness in a condition of absolute existential exposure. This man without a city is no longer “Timon,” and no longer “of Athens.” He finds a new identity in misanthropy, and he inaugurates it by renaming himself. Henceforth he answers those who ask who he is with the snarl “I am Misanthropos, and hate mankind” (4.3.53). All his speech is now curse and denial, his sole food the roots he digs in the forest, his only attire his own skin, and his abode a bare cave.

The fallen, railing Timon is, like Apemantus, a philosopher, contrary to what Rolf Soellner states in his monograph *Timon of Athens, Shakespeare’s Pessimistic Tragedy*: “Timon is no philosopher and no clear line in his thought is discernible” (137). Thinking does not need to follow a clear discursive line to be philosophical. Among the various movements in ancient philosophy, Cynicism for instance focused exclusively on ethical practice at the expense of speculative thinking. Cynicism, which Apemantus faithfully represents in the play, was for the most part a sententious worldview combined with a minimalist lifestyle, and it never worked out a systematic logic, physics, or metaphysics. The classical Cynic was “an anti-theorist, antidogmatist, and anti-scholastic” (Sloterdijk 303). Moreover, even some speculative philosophers, e.g. some Presocratics, did not regard systematicity and logical rigour as indispensable features of their thought. Like Timon’s passionate speeches in the wilderness, their writings were emotional, dramatic, and loaded with imagery,

For the raging Timon, architecture and clothes become as it were two proximate, associated emblems of civilisation. This association between building and clothing has in fact some anthropological validity; compare for instance Gottfried Semper’s theory of the origins and fundamental elements of architecture. Primitive architecture relied for one of its basic functions – that of Umfriedigung (enclosing, fencing in, vertical delimiting) – on weaving, braiding, and textiles; hence the etymological link between Wand (wall) and Gewand (raiment) (Semper 57; see also 56-68). Clothing separates and protects the body from the outside, as do the walls of the house at another relay, and beyond them, the walls of the city as well.

This assertion is all the odder since in his overview of classical and Renaissance sources for *Timon of Athens*, Soellner has collected a number of authors who unequivocally call Timon a philosopher. For instance, according to Pierre Boaistuau (*Theatrum Mundi*, English translation 1586), of all the ancient philosophers who hated man “Timon, a philosopher of Athens, was the most affectioned patriarch of this sect” (qtd. in Soellner 213). Consider in this connection Sloterdijk’s warning, “Great is the danger of underestimating the philosophical import of Cynicism on the grounds that it enjoys a ‘merely’ anecdotal transmission” (303).
metaphor, and allusion. The emotionality of Presocratic philosophy may account for Montaigne’s mention of Timon and his equally emotional misanthropy in the essay “On Heraclitus and Democritus” (418). Montaigne discusses Timon’s hate in comparison with the two other primal philosophical passions, Heraclitean sadness and Democritean cheer. In addition, the Presocratics – especially their most poetically minded representative, Empedocles – remind us of Timon in their bold use of performative language. Presocratic and Timonist curses, blessings and invocations seek to bring about states of affairs rather than just to reflect on the pre-existing ones (reflection being the limit of discursive constative philosophy).

Extraordinarily impassioned speeches are likewise taken as proof of Timon’s philosophical status in Lucian’s second-century dialogue Timon, or the Misanthrope, to which Shakespeare’s play is indebted either directly or via intermediary Renaissance sources. In Lucian, Zeus’ attention is caught by Timon raging on earth, and Zeus comments: “Who is that who is shouting from Attica? […] A mouthy fellow and an impudent one. Very likely he is a philosopher” (vii, 333). Even Athens, as soon as Timon begins to rail against it, perceives enough of the philosophical in his speech and behaviour to start a rumour that he now imitates Apemantus in his Cynic antics. The rumour promptly brings Apemantus to the woods, in the intention to strip Timon of Cynic credibility and to unmask him as a dilettante who passes himself for some newfangled thing called “Misanthropos” (4.3.53). Timon’s misanthropy certainly shares many ideas, philosophical attributes, and colourful details with Apemantus’ Cynicism. Both Apemantus and Timon favour roots as their sustenance; both despise Athens and riches; and both love to use the appellation “dog” (in allusion to one popular etymology of the word Cynic: dog-like, from kuon, dog).

Notwithstanding this resemblance to Apemantus’ Cynicism, Timon’s misanthropy is sui generis. Philosophers like Apemantus, Diogenes, or Socrates are the moral gadflies of the city, and they practice their calling on the assumption that a fit of pique may have a salubrious effect on the irritated. Despite appearances to the contrary, the harsh Socratic elenchus and the rude Cynic rants are intended to benefit their victims. Indeed, Cynicism possesses some philanthropic and even utopian dimensions, recognizable in Apemantus’ “heaven” of good counsel (1.2.245). Timon’s misanthropy, by contrast, appears to cast a dystopian shadow over the entire world. Uniformly bleak, the misanthropic insight into man’s nature cannot bear to encounter any exceptions that undermine its validity. When he witnesses one honest, sympathetic man – his former steward Flavius – Timon is pained by this deviation from the general pattern of human wickedness and treachery: “It almost turns my dangerous nature wild. […] I do proclaim / One honest man – mistake me not, but one, / No more, I pray […] How fain would I have hated all mankind” (4.3.484-491). At misanthropy’s most perverse extreme, Timon prays for the non-existence of honest men, so that his worldview is universally justified. Unwilling to dwell on the marvel of Flavius’ goodness for too long, Timon drives him away with the advice that Flavius should

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6 According to Sloterdijk, in his practical influence on human affairs, a Cynic philosopher may turn out to be philanthropic rather than misanthropic (309), “biophilic” (309), and capable of a “humanizing and balancing effect” (308).
“build from men” (4.3.518), that is, keep far from where men live when he sets up a new home for himself. Such an anti-social home would situate Flavius outside the city, yet he would still enjoy the comforts of civilized life. In Lucian’s *Timon, or the Misanthrope*, this scenario reflects the fate of Timon himself after he accidentally digs out a treasure in the forest (Lucian xli, 371; cf. the discovery of the treasure at 4.3.25 in *Timon of Athens*). Lucian’s Timon erects a well-fortified tower on the spot where he found the treasure, and lives there in blissful isolation for the rest of his days, chasing away any unwanted visitors from Athens who dare come too close (xlii-xlv, 373-377). Shakespeare’s Timon, however, does not consider this or any similar arrangements, since they would recreate the physical features of the city in the middle of the wilderness. As his furious speech against the wall of Athens shows (4.1.1-41; see above), Timon resents not only the citizens but also the very texture of the city moulded by them to suit their fancies and excesses. Resolved to subtract the city, in all its facets, from his life, Timon chooses nature. Henceforth he will sleep no more in spaces that are human artefacts: neither in Lucian’s tower, nor in anything like Diogenes’ tub. Nor will he move from one urban mansion to another, as the restlessly roaming and observing Apemantus seems to do. Instead, Timon lies at night, as he puts it, “under what’s above me” (4.3.294).

Although Timon hates Athens, this hate does not turn him into a worshipper of nature, a Jacques of sorts. Jacques, the melancholic malcontent in *As You Like It*, chooses nature because the city is not as perfect as nature, Timon because nature is not as bad as the city. The forest, the cave, and the windy beach attract Shakespeare’s most extreme misanthrope only inasmuch as they are devoid of civilisation. Rather than appreciating nature in and of itself, he valuates it as a negation of the city, that is, in relative rather than absolute terms: he finds “th’unkindest beast,” for instance, “more kinder” in comparison to unkind man (4.1.36). Yet these are precarious grounds for preferring nature to culture. Although the beast is better than man, its essence is not kindness but still unkindness, even if of a different or lesser sort. The same, Timon will find, applies to nature as a whole. Originally recruited in Timon’s curses as a nemesis of culture, nature soon begins to mock him with grievances similar to those for which he renounced culture. Dramatic irony thus undermines the logic of revenge as Timon’s avenging ally proves to be more closely connected with Timon’s enemy than was to be expected.\(^7\) While he digs for roots, the fare of hermits and outcasts, the earth perversely yields him a treasure of gold (4.3.25), as though nature purposed his restoration to his former wealth and status in Athens. Another facet of the sympathy between nature and the city that Timon will eventually abhor lies in nature’s dependence on the redistribution and conversion of substance. When Timon first comes to the forest, he entreats nature to be on his side and to turn the human world upside down as part of the elemental cycle of water and vapours:

\[
\text{TIMON.} \quad \text{O blessed breeding sun, draw from the earth}
\]
\[
Rotten humidity; below thy sister’s [the moon’s] orb
\]
\[
Infect the air [...] \]

\(^7\) On the mutual influences between nature and the city in light of the Christian *contemptus mundi*, and on the paradoxes of choosing nature as a fellow-avenger, see Soellner 138-139.
Raise me this beggar and demit that lord,
The senator shall bear contempt hereditary,
The beggar native honour (4.3.1-14).

Later on, however, Timon proclaims his loathing for the same process of circulation between the heavenly bodies and the earth, since this process amounts to stealing. How could nature judge or punish men for their lawlessness if it permits such promiscuous robbery within its own domain? Timon delivers a chilling condemnation of criminal nature in a speech to three banditti (deserting soldiers from Alcibiades’ army), who have come to steal his newfound gold:

TIMON. I’ll example you with thievry.
The sun’s a thief, and with his great attraction
Rob the vast sea. The moon’s an arrant thief,
And her pale fire she snatches from the sun.
The sea’s a thief, whose liquid surge resolves
The moon into salt tears. The earth’s a thief,
That feeds and breeds by a composture stol’n
From gen’ral excrement. Each thing’s a thief.

[...] To Athens go,
Break open shops; nothing can you steal
But thieves do lose it. (4.3.428-441)

Timon depicts a finite universe with a finite availability of substance in it, which is perpetually re-transmitted but never newly generated. In this barren world, we gain not only our alienable possessions but also our very life force and elemental being from incursions upon others.

Nature’s harshest, but also most predictable, betrayal of Timon is her inability to keep men out of the wilderness. Just while Timon pledges nature to breed the human kind no more, numerous citizens from all social strata – prostitutes, soldiers, artists, and politicians – are approaching, seeking, finding, and bothering him in his forest retreat. The harried Timon exclaims in disbelieving revulsion: “More man? Plague, plague!” (4.3.197). Note that “man” is in the singular, as though human beings were a mass of which one can measure greater or smaller, yet consistently unbearable, quantities. In its en-masse momentum, the crowd shatters the philosopher’s utopian prerogative of emigrating from civilization and society to nature and solitude. Athens is now a nightmare out of which Timon cannot awake: even though he tried to leave the city, the city won’t leave him. The city has mobilized itself, migrated along with

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8 Paster makes a very different claim about the psychological intricacy of Timon’s inclinations and desires once he is in the wilderness. She argues that Timon perversely desires the citizens to come so that he can vent his rage upon them: “Timon’s earlier need to draw men to him has become a complementary need to draw out hostility that will confirm his new social mythology [of misrule], his anti-civic identity. Indeed, the succession of characters whom Timon meets here is so perfectly suited to his new imaginative needs that their encounters come to resemble a dream in which the subject can reshape intractable reality. Timon gets a chance to reenact in a new and aggressive key earlier exchanges” (105). But if this were so, if Timon really preferred to have company against
the philosopher, and now bustles about the wilderness as though the wilderness were yet another city in the making. Before the end of Timon’s days, we will even witness a choice delegacy of the Athenian senate conducting negotiations with Timon in front of a cave, a farce of an agora (5.2). The city has thus brought over to the forest not only its people, in all their burgeoning variety, but also its institutions, including the senate, the army, and the brothel, as well as its peculiar civil problems – in this case an imminent military coup planned by Alcibiades, against whom the senators want to enlist Timon’s prowess and newfound gold.

Together with Apemantus, Timon had fantasised that a plague of bloodthirsty animals should come upon Athens (4.3.317-343), “[so] that beasts / May have the world in empire” (4.3.384-5), but savage nature neglects to show the city crowds this cruel face of hers. Instead of sending beasts to men, nature allows the men to inundate her. Yet, the non-occurrence of the beast apocalypse does not disappoint Apemantus all that much. Although earlier Apemantus proclaimed his grandiose wish to “give [the world to] the beasts, to be rid of the men” and even agreed to “fall [himself] in the confusion of men, and remain a beast with the beasts” (4.3.321-2), later he incongruously corrects himself: “Would ‘twere so, / But not till I am dead” (4.3.385-6). Apemantus may revile the city for its depraved ways but, being a city philosopher, he is not keen on witnessing its total demise. Nor does he consider a beastly life, a life without the city, to be possible for a city man like Timon. Apemantus mocks Timon for his illusion that he can erase the habits and memories with which Athens has imprinted him, and live with a fresh mind, and with content, in a pleasing, innocent natural environment:

APEMANTUS. What, think’st
That the bleak air, thy boisterous chamberlain,
Will put thy shirt on warm? Will these mossed trees
That have outlived the eagle page thy heels
And skip when thou point’st out? Will the cold brook,
Candied with ice, caudle thy morning taste
To cure thy o’ernight’s surfeit? (4.3.221-227)

In Apemantus’ judgment, spoiled Timon cannot help projecting old domestic habits on his dour new habitation. Instead of experiencing nature in its own right, Timon expects it to offer equivalents to the comforts of his prosperous city mansion. The parodic daintiness of Apemantus’ speech underscores the pathetic misapprehensions – seeing sugar frosting in the brook’s ice, etc. – that Apemantus attributes to Timon. The mention of candy and an “overnight surfeit” must be particularly gruelling for Timon since, as we may infer, by now he is pained by hunger. The discovery of the treasure and the endless succession of visitors from Athens have delayed first his laborious search for roots, then the consumption thereof. Guessing the inadequacy of forest nourishment, Apemantus has brought food from the city for this ex-citizen who plays which to rail rather than to be alone, he would be indistinguishable from Apemantus, and thus a Cynic, not a misanthrope. Moreover, if he perversely enjoyed the succession of visitors in the forest, the total effect of the play would degenerate to that of a farce, and Timon of Athens would be pure satire rather than a (admittedly problematic) tragedy.

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at life-in-accordance-with-nature. Just as Timon is finally about to bite into a root, Apemantus intervenes and offers a better fare: “Here, I will mend thy feast” (4.3.284). Rather than a gesture of charity, the meal may be bait designed to provoke Timon’s confession of his neediness and distress, and the folly of his isolation. The food is pushed under his nose to prove to him that, notwithstanding his vociferous repudiations of the city, he does crave sugar frosting when he sees the ice on the brook. Apemantus is confident that Timon can exorcise neither the banqueter nor the citizen in himself and that, as he tells Timon, “Thou’dst courtier be again / Wert thou not beggar” (4.3.241-2). According to Apemantus, Timon eats roots “enforcedly” (4.3.241) despite his inclination, since in the wilderness he cannot obtain better food – in contrast to Apemantus, who eats roots in the middle of a city feast supposedly out of an authentic philosophical commitment (1.2.70).

Dietary standards and references to food as a civilizing factor become a charged subject in the second half of the play. The opposition between nature and culture is reflected in the difference between the raw and the cooked, between the earth’s roots and steaming “covered dishes” that promise “royal cheer” at feasts (3.7.45-6), as they did at the banquets that Timon once gave. Civilisation is sweet, social graces are saccharine, and Timon admits that in his prosperous days he enjoyed the world of Athens as his own “confectionery” (4.3.260). From his present vantage point however, Timon realizes that urban man lusts for cornucopias, gastronomic and otherwise, that surpass both the natural human need and what nature should in fairness allot to man. The feasts of the city stultified and ruined Timon. More generally, its society of gastronomic delectation can corrupt any human being’s intelligence and ethical sense: “man with liquorish draughts / And morsels unctuous greases his pure mind, / That from it all consideration slips!” (4.3.194-6). The engorged city is not a place for higher thoughts and virtues, not a place for philosophy. The close association between city culture, food, and the neglect of thinking and moral accountability sickens Timon and spoils him every single bite he takes even now in the forest. As he ingests his roots, Timon cannot avoid thinking compulsively about the city: “That the whole life of Athens were in this! / Thus would I eat it. / He bites the root” (4.3.283-4).

Timon’s eating disorder is perhaps more serious, and more sinister, than it appeared to be in Apemantus’ sardonic judgment; still, it is not so radical as to blunt completely Timon’s simplest biological need – hunger. Based on his life in Athens, Timon seems to have assumed that eating has everything to do with civic culture and expected that his desire to eat would subside, or even disappear, when he ceases to inhabit the domain of culture. But of course, eating has at least as much to do with nature, in particular with human nature, and at one point Timon’s demanding stomach quite bewilders him: “That nature [his own essence], being sick of man’s unkindness, / Should yet be hungry! Common mother [i.e. the earth, …] Yield him who all thy human sons doth hate, / From forth thy plenteous bosom, one poor root” (4.3.177-186). In the heart of nature, Timon is surprised by hunger, an element of that nature which is peculiar to him as a human being. An alimentary agony threatens him, as he is digging for food all the time yet remains perpetually underfed. Timon is human, all too human both in his misanthropic revulsion from food and in his tormented search for the last food that his stubborn misanthropy would permit him to have.
Timon’s experiences in the wilderness demonstrate that it is impossible for him to find an innocent space, a spot completely free of civilisation. All city things from which Timon tried to escape – appetite and greed, gold and throngs of gold lovers, flattery and hypocrisy, thievry and betrayal – he encounters again in the wilderness. He was wrong in thinking nature impervious to the incursions of the city, but equally, he had been wrong in the first place to perceive the city with its moral and economic pitfalls as unnatural, as the one ulcer in the tissue of an otherwise orderly and healthy universe. To speak with classical political thinkers such as Aristotle, a city “consisteth by nature” (*Aristotles politiques* sig. D4r.) in the same manner that a beehive does, because men, like bees, are sociable animals. For Aristotle, the city is “compounded of men naturally Ciuill and Politicke”, men naturally predetermined to join in a community (sig. D5r). Men must live together if they are to realize their *telos* of “self-sufficiency” defined as the state in which one has all things and therefore neither lacks nor desires anything (see sig. D5r). The term “self-sufficiency” (the early modern translation of Aristotle’s *autárkeia*), we must note, is paradoxical because it posits that man can satisfy the needs and wants of his self only by being in the company of others and by drawing on their aid. In isolation, the human being remains needy, debilitated, and imperfect. If man is to avoid this vulnerability and achieve his state of sufficiency and perfection, he must share his life with other men.

In light of Aristotle’s ideas, the question why Timon cannot escape from civilisation in the wilderness is simply answered: because he has brought himself – a man – to the wilderness and with himself, inevitably, also the great tug of humanity: “More man” (4.3.197) and again, “More things like men” (4.3.390). Whither one man goes, even one who proclaims that he hates mankind, thither other men shall follow. One man in one place is already society *in potentia*, and there is no misanthrope who can counteract the human force of attraction, an impulse so definitive of our nature according to Aristotle. The processional rhythm of the scenes in the wilderness, with so many characters coming by and passing on, has inspired classic readings of the play as a pageant. In light of Aristotle’s ideas, we may see in the pageantry of *Timon of Athens* not only a form of dramatic presentation but also a lesson in political anthropology.

As a man willy-nilly bound to men due to the unrelenting gregariousness of the species, Timon is to some extent his own problem, the catalyst of his own misery. Self-hate accordingly accompanies his misanthropy and becomes a paradox that others cannot understand (as Alcibiades asks, “Is man so hateful to thee / That are thyself a man?” 4.3.51-2). Yet, Timon cannot undo himself as man and exist in some new form less attractive to men. A metamorphosis from human into animal remains only a philosophical phantasm that the misanthrope Timon and the Cynic Apemantus bandy about in their forest debate (4.3.321-344). Timon’s only possible release now is death, as Apemantus exhorts him: “Thou shouldst desire to die, being miserable” (4.3.248). Before long, Timon entertains the same thought: “I am sick of this false world […] Then, Timon [he addresses himself], presently prepare thy grave” (4.3.368-370). The grave, a vacuum in which “all things” are mercifully reduced to “nothing” (5.2.73),

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9 See for instance M. C. Bradbrook’s chapter “Blackfriars: The Pageant of Timon of Athens” in *Shakespeare the Craftsman*, where she describes the structure of the play as “a structure by means of apposition, rather than development of a plot” (163).
appears to be the innocent space that Timon could not find in nature. Innocence, if at all possible, must amount to such emptiness, of which neither the city nor nature are capable. This is yet another feature that the city and nature share, to the displeasure of Timon, who has tried to keep apart two realms that actually interpenetrate each other. Since there is no culture outside nature and no nature in complete isolation from culture, and since both are far from innocent, Timon is left without an environment. But to sustain themselves, human beings must form meaningful relationships to some animating milieu, be it the city or the wilderness. Without an environment, Timon possesses no life-world either. Given the choice between an existential void and the grave, he opts for the latter.

An immediate and simple death would best epitomize the nihilism that Timon has reached. But as it stands, Timon’s death abounds in mystery, ambiguity, and polysemy, and he embarks upon it with some delay, and with repeated leave-taking. By and by, the announcement of Timon’s demise comes from one of Alcibiades’ soldiers (5.5.66). The evidence consists of a tomb by the sea, while the body – wherever it may be – remains dramatically occluded. Whether the misanthropic hermit has died a natural death or committed suicide Athens will never learn. Since no one is known to have attended upon him in his last hours, the play breeds the uncanny suspicion that he has somehow managed to bury himself. Living or dead, the misanthrope does not permit other men to interfere in his affairs. In its proud loneliness, Timon’s death can take an honorary place next to the legendary suicide of another philosopher, Empedocles. While the latter committed himself to the flames of Etna, Timon lies low under the “light foam” of the sea (4.3.371).

Is Timon’s burial ground by the seashore a sign of his final preference for nature over culture? Does the dying Timon dedicate himself exclusively to nature? This may be true of Empedocles and other Presocratic philosophers, whom Aristotle collectively called “the naturalists.” Empedocles chose to dissolve his particular existence in the elemental crucible of nature and thus into pure immanence. Timon’s death, by contrast, is not a form of dissolution; it leaves an irreducible human trace – a grave with an inscribed tombstone – which permanently changes the coastal landscape. This artefact is not the kind of nondescript tomb into which a fatigued life has thrown itself carelessly, as though in consonance with the slogan “I care not” (5.2.62) overused by Timon during his last stage appearance when he rejects the pleas of the delegated Athenian senators (5.2). Some thought and care on Timon’s part must have been necessary to furnish the tombstone with not just one but several epitaphs, whose conjoined effect underlines the charismatic character of Timon’s death. The epitaphs are composed in such a way as to contradict each other, to baffle readers, and simultaneously to insult and exhort them. These messages perpetuate the complexities and dead ends of Timon’s misanthropic life also into his grave:

Timon is dead, who hath outstretched his span.
Some beast read this; there does not live a man.  (16.3-4)\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) The Norton Shakespeare from which I have been quoting deletes this distich, which is read by a soldier (the soldier who discovers the tomb) rather than by Alcibiades (who reads the rest) and thus...
'Here lies a wretched corpse,  
     Of wretched soul bereft.  
Seek not my name. A plague consume  
     You wicked caitiffs left!  
Here lie I, Timon, who alive  
All living men did hate.  
Pass by and curse thy fill – but pass,  
     And stay not here thy gait.' (5.5.71-78)

Despite their mutual contradictions, all the inscriptions strive to inform, to communicate with passers-by, and beyond this, even to shape their responses to the tomb – hence the imperatives “some beast read this,” “seek not my name,” and “pass by and curse thy fill – but pass and stay not here thy gait.” Beside the inscribed epitaphs, Timon, while still alive, has prospectively composed yet another epitaph, to be disseminated by word-of-mouth:

Come not to me again, but say to Athens,  
Timon hath made his everlasting mansion  
Upon the beached verge of the salt flood,  
Who once a day with his embossed froth  
The turbulent surge shall cover. Thither come,  
And let my gravestone be your oracle. (5.2.99-104)

Timon hereby invites all Athenians to visit his grave and contemplate the inscriptions as they would an oracle. He does not entirely leave out the tone of misanthropic hostility: as he suggests elsewhere, he writes his epitaph so that “death in me at others’ lives may laugh” (4.3.373). Yet, there is a change in his attitude. While previously he tried to keep men away, or, when this was impossible, he sought to harm those who pestered him, now he proclaims in his anticipatory epitaph that everyone should come and heed his posthumous admonitions.

Apart from reconsidering his relationship with men, Timon’s valediction betrays a desire for an intimate communion with the natural forces. He imagines how day by day the “turbulent surge shall cover” him, his tombstone, and the beach under a frothy blanket. Enduring the ebb and tide of “the salt flood” – an allegory of the fort-da dynamic underlying human existence – Timon’s body in the end accepts the need for contact with his natural as well as with his social environment. Ideally for the human being, both kinds of contact should not grow burdensome; rather, they should alternate between approach and avoidance in consonance with the ebbing and flowing of the sea. Yet, however uneven or cyclic, the connection with one’s life-sustaining milieu must be maintained. Centuries after Timon, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra will unceasingly

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appears separately from the two other epitaphs. The latter seem to be the central inscriptions, whereas the “Timon is dead…” distich may be a kind of introductory superscription. John Jowett’s excellent Oxford edition of Timon includes the distich at 16.3-4 (Jowett uses scene numbers only); see also his explanatory note on the same passage, which is included in the text of the play by most editors, one exception being the Norton editors.
alternate between the solitude of his mountain cave and various cities where he comes to unleash his philosophy upon the citizens.\textsuperscript{11}

The impossibility of separating nature from culture drove Timon, while living, to despair. His imminent death, however, endows him with “rich conceit” (5.5.82) and a rightly reasoned philosophical attitude towards nature and culture, whose synthesis is embodied in Timon’s thoughtfully composed grave. Sunk fast in the sandy beach, the “low grave” (5.5.84) pays homage to nature, whose timelessness, graciously transferred to the grave, makes it “everlasting” (5.2.100). But the charismatic inscriptions on the tombstone proclaim it a piece of man-made art and an unmistakable mark of reason and culture.\textsuperscript{12} Man is the only beast that possesses language with which to write epitaphs, and with which also to form, according to Aristotle, concepts of justice, fairness, and duty – concepts that facilitate social bonds and the formation of cities and states.\textsuperscript{13} An inevitably mocking echo of this same Aristotelian postulate appears in one of the epitaphs’ commands, “Some beast read this; there does not live a man” (see footnote 10, above). Man, moreover, is the only beast that inter the body to honour it. The location of a tomb (like Timon’s) in the middle of a wilderness poignantly enhances its humanity and its aura as an artefact. Thus Adolf Loos: “If we were to come across a mound in the woods, six foot long by three foot wide, with the soil piled up in a pyramid, a sombre mood would come over us and a voice inside us would say, ‘There is someone buried here’. \textit{That is architectural art}” (84).\textsuperscript{14}

Despite the moral debris accumulated by the play, the last scene attempts to restore confidence in architecture as a symbol of the human impulse to build, shape, create, and consolidate, be it works of fine art or forms of social organization. The senators supplicate Alcibiades not to lay waste to Athens because its significance and beauty transcend the sins of its present generation, which in any event will soon be superseded, in accordance with the natural course of things. The architectonic majesty of the city is an especially palpable argument for its pardon. Thus civilisation and its art sue for peace:

\textsuperscript{11} For a more extensive comparative reading of Timon and Zarathustra, see Knight 224-229. According to Harold Bloom (18-19), \textit{Timon of Athens} may actually have been a source of inspiration for Nietzsche in shaping the figure of Zarathustra as a recluse, his speeches, and his interactions with other characters, notably with the fool called “Zarathustra’s ape” (an Apemantus-type) in “On Passing By,” \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, Bk. 3 (Nietzsche 195).

\textsuperscript{12} On the inscribed tombstone in its symbolic setting as a work of art, and on Timon’s triumph as an artist (poet, painter, architect), see de Alvarez 195-8, and Soellner 142.

\textsuperscript{13} Another famous thesis from Aristotle: “Man herefore is more sociable then any Bee, or other creature whatsoeuer that desires societie: which is manifest by this, that Nature who hath bestowed the power of Speech vpon man, maketh nothing in vaine […] Speech is giuen vnfo vs to signifie what is profitable and what vnprofitable, and consequently what is iust and what uniu st. For this is a propicie belonging vnfo man aboue all other liuing creatures, that he onely hath a sense and feeling of good and euill, and of iust and uniu st. The communion of which things begetteth and establisheth a house and a Citie” (\textit{Aristotles politiques} sig. D5r).

\textsuperscript{14} Translation negligibly emended to convey more clearly Loos’ sense here. According to Loos, architecture is not an art, but there is a single exception to this: the architecture of monuments, which fall under the heading of genuinely artistic production (see 83).
FIRST SENATOR. These walls of ours
Were not erected by their hands from whom
You have received your grief; nor are they such
That these great tow’rs, trophies, and schools should fall
For private faults in them. (5.5.22-26)

As Alcibiades announces that he will not sack the city, he receives news of Timon’s death. Alcibiades’ closing speech accomplishes two things: first, it commemorates Timon, with whom Alcibiades has felt deep sympathy throughout Timon’s fall; and second, it reassures the senators of Alcibiades’ relenting thoughts. The two purposes of the speech intertwine in meaningful ways. Alcibiades’ decision to spare the city and its majestic walls reminds us of the inverse attitude in his friend Timon, who used to hurl curses at these same walls and contrived to pay for their destruction (4.3.105-128). Now that he is dead, however, and mourned by Alcibiades, Timon indirectly furthers the cause of saving Athens. The profuse lachrymal imagery, the description of a sympathetic sea landscape, and the decorous tone of solace, concession, and humility in Alcibiades’ commemorative speech soften his warrior soul and accord with his intention to acts of mercy. Timon was a misanthrope in life, yet death transforms him into a prophet of social ethics, a genius loci of the shore embraced daily by Neptune, and a guardian of Athens. After much suffering in the wilderness as in the city, the late Timon becomes for those who survive him the paragon of a philosophical wisdom that accepts the ills and wells of both nature and culture.

Works Cited

NB: All translations from works listed with German titles are mine.


Zusammenfassung

SHAKESPEARE AT THE FRINGE: PLAYING THE METROPOLIS

BY

YVONNE ZIPS

What would London be without Shakespeare? And what would Shakespeare be without London? The notion that this connection is worth pursuing is supported by the fact that the contemporary English novelist and critic Peter Ackroyd published *Shakespeare: The Biography* within four years of his *London: The Biography*. In his introduction to *London*, Ackroyd refers to a figure taken from a Roman bronze in which the city had “been envisaged in the form of a young man with his arms outstretched in a gesture of liberation” (Ackroyd, *London* 1). The image of the city as a human body does not only illustrate the concept of the city in early modern times, but also emblematises “the energy and exultation of a city continually expanding in great waves of progress and of confidence” (*London* 1). Even if we can only speculate about why Shakespeare abandoned his family in Stratford-upon-Avon and came to London, he sought his fortune in the early modern metropolis. As Peter Ackroyd notes, it was at Shakespeare’s time “commonly reported of players that some ‘have gone to London very meanly and have come in time to be exceeding wealthy’” (Ackroyd, *Shakespeare* 104). But not only the chances of success made people come to London, it was the (ambivalent) energy of the city itself which attracted foreigners:

A traveller entering the city for the first time could not help but be profoundly moved or disturbed by the experience. It assaulted all of the senses with its stridency and vigour. It was a vortex of energy. It was voracious. The traveller was surrounded by street-traders or by merchants beseeching him to buy; he was hustled and jostled. It was a city of continuous noise – of argument, of conflict, of street-selling, of salutations [...] and more often than not it smelled terribly of dung and offal and human labour. (*Shakespeare* 105)

What could be a better inspiration and matrix for the young and ambitious actor and playwright William Shakespeare than this expanding, vital, ambivalent and self-conscious city? On several feast days the city turned into a “piece of moving scenery” (*Shakespeare* 109), when members of the various guilds, knights and merchants wore their appropriate costumes and were accompanied by ensigns and bannerettes. There were not only stages and platforms upon which tableaux were performed, the city itself changed into a stage upon which London performed itself as a spectacle. As a result, the boundaries between players and spectators were blurred and the city became “a piece of intense theatricality in which life and art were lit by the same pure, bright flame” (*Shakespeare* 109).
The City as Theatre of Social Action

In the 1930s the American historian and philosopher Lewis Mumford defined the city as a “theatre of social action” because “[t]he city fosters art and is art; the city creates the theater and is the theater” (Makeham 150). In his article “Performing the City” Paul Makeham develops Mumford’s definition further and argues that the city “is as imaginary and ephemeral as performance, because it is a performance – of individual and collective values, desires, memories and aspirations” as it is “animated through the collective actions of individuals, exchanging signs and meanings, in dialogue and conflict with one another, seeing and being seen, telling stories, enacting the core rituals of performance” (157). In our time driven by an “event-culture” (Klein 14), the performance aspect of the city may seem nothing new. In early modern London, however, experiencing the city fundamentally changed the perception of theatre: city dwellers were used to a certain theatricality of life in the city. Therefore Shakespeare could (dramatically) play with city space on a meta-theatrical level. In the following I would like to compare conceptions of urban performativity in Shakespeare’s plays with Michel de Certeau’s opposing perspectives on the city. In The Practice of Everyday Life, Certeau tries to reveal the hidden structures of urban life through a semiotic and poetic analysis of everyday practices of modern life. In his chapter “Walking the City” he analyses the relationship of New York and its inhabitants distinguishing two different perspectives on the city: “The ordinary practitioners of the city live ‘down below’, below the threshold at which visibility begins. They walk – an elementary form of this experience of the city [...]” (93). According to Certeau’s quotation, early modern Londoners can be considered as “walkers, Wandersmänner, whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban ‘text’, they write without being able to read it” (93). Opposed to this perspective is a spatially different one:

To be lifted to the summit of the World Trade Center is to be lifted out of the city’s grasp. One’s body is no longer clasped by the streets [...] when one goes up there, he leaves behind mass that carries off and mixes up in itself any identity of authors or spectators [...] [T]his transfigures him into a voyeur. It puts him at a distance. (92)

The totalizing gaze of the “voyeur” turns the experience of the city into a homogeneous whole, an anonymous urban space, where its inhabitants become inseparable from its architecture, leaving little or even no space for individuality. Translating these perspectives back to city dwellers in early modern London, I would like to argue that the perspective of the “voyeur” corresponds with the meta-theatrical level of being a self-reflective spectator of Shakespeare’s plays, whereas the “walking” perspective corresponds with the personal experience of being an urban player acting out urban self-fashioning within the city space.

I would like to argue that Shakespeare creatively explored the knowledge of his “Wandersmänner” audience with respect to urban performativity and that his plays, to speak with Makeham, “enable[d] citizens to invent – through memory, imagination and desires – new ideas about themselves and their relationship with the urban landscape” (Makeham 157). While these ‘walkers’ in the ‘real’ city wrote stories they
were not able to read, their experiences were made “readable” and visible during the
dramatic performance.

The Situationists International

Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and *As You Like It* in particular allow for
such a shift of perspective and they also introduce, *avant la lettre*, ideals and practices
of the Situationist International (SI), a movement that intended (and tried to establish)
an open-minded society critical of the ruling power structures.

Unfold a street map of London, place a glass, rim down, anywhere on the map, and draw round
its edge. Pick the map, go out into the city, and walk the circle, keeping as close as you can to
the curve. Record the experience as you go, in whatever medium you favour: film, photograph,
manuscript, tape. Catch the textual run-off the streets; the graffiti, the branded litter, the snatches
of conversation. Cut for sign. Log the data-stream. Be alert to the happenstance of metaphors,
watch for visual rhymes, coincidences, analogies, family resemblances, the changing of the
street. Complete the circle, and the record ends. Walking makes for content; footage for footage.
(MacFarlane 9)

This is part of the beginner’s guide to psychogeography, a term that was introduced by
the Lettrist Group, one of several loosely bound avant-garde grouping in the 1960s.
Combining psychology and geography, psychogeography became a method of trans-
forming urban life for aesthetic as well as political purposes. Developing and rad-
icalising this concept, the Situationists International revolted against the “spectacle of
capital, party politics and imperialism” (Sadler 43):

The Situationist came up with the headiest mix of the main ingredients of sixties activism,
protest, art, counter-culture, and fun: the ‘liberation of desire’; the energetic involvement of
everyone; sustained attacks on ‘bourgeois society’; aiming at its overthrowal. Bourgeois society
was excoriated for its consumerism and the passivity of the masses; it was the ‘society of the
spectacle’, with art merely a part of consumerism. (Marwick 33)

What the Situationists aimed for was a radical change of society. In their “Report on
the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s
Conditions of Organization and Action” the SI proclaims: “First of all, we think the
world must be changed. We want the most liberating change of the society and life in
which we find ourselves confined” (Knabb 25). This ‘most liberating change’ was
meant to be performed by acting on the individual attitude and therefore altering
society in general. Closely connected with this change was the negotiation of urban
space. In “Formulary for a New Urbanism” the SI states: “We are bored in the city,
there is no longer any Temple of the Sun. [...] You’ll never see the hacienda. It doesn’t
exist. *The hacienda must be built*” (Knabb 1). Modern industrial society was seen as
dominated by the “spectacle” as “Selbstporträt der Macht in der Epoche ihrer
totalitären Verwaltung der Existenzbedingungen” (Wiegmink 84), which became the
declared enemy of the SI, because it alienated its subjects from the world and turned
them into passive spectators of their own lives (85). For a change of everyday
behaviour the ‘hacienda’ had to be completely rebuilt: “[T]ransforming the everyday
requires certain conditions. A break with the everyday by means of festival – violent or peaceful – cannot endure. In order to change life, society, space, architecture, even the city must change” (Lefèbvre 11). To act against the passivity of the “society of spectacle” the SI tried to develop different ‘means of action’ to bring its lulled victims back to life: “Our central idea is the construction of situations, that is to say, the concrete construction of momentary ambiences of life and their transformation into a superior passional quality” (Knabb 38). One way to experiment with a “a new mode of behavior” was the dérive which tried to provoke a playful and constructive behaviour and awareness of psychogeographical effects: “In a dérive one or more persons during a certain period drop their relations, their work and leisure activities, and all their other usual motives for movement and action, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there” (Knabb 62).

Although the SI joined the Rousseauean tradition of disliking theatre as a place of illusion and was critical of theatrical means to achieve a change of society, their theoretical approach can be described with a contemporary conception of performance: “The key to this newer, and at the same time older form of spectacle is total participation, the breaking down of the arbitrary barrier between stage and audience. All the actors now become spectators, and all the spectators actors. No one any longer represents anyone other than himself” (Barish 290). The answer to the ‘society of spectacle’ was the “urban festival” which was “re-establishing the ‘right to the city’” (Jay 420) and which was regarded as an “expression of a collective creativity” (Wiegmink 92) instead of a society that only stands outside and watches.

Along with these changing ideals of society/social space goes the change of spatial practices. As spatial structures produce/enable certain kinds of action, they reproduce/reinforce spatial structures. To describe this phenomenon, the German sociologist Martina Löw differentiates between an ‘absolutistic’ and a ‘relativistic’ concept of space: the ‘absolutistic’ concept of space construes space as independent from action and the bodies that move within it (“Behältnisraum”); from the perspective of the ‘relativistic’ theory, space is dependent on bodies and their action: as bodies are in permanent action, space is in permanent change, too (Löw 24-35).

**Shakespeare’s Plays: “Every story is a travel story, a spatial practice”**

In the following I would like to discuss Shakespeare’s negotiation of urban space as a playful sense of subversion, transfiguring a spirit of political radicalism and as a way to transform urban environment along the lines of the ‘situationistic’ practices. In *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and *As You Like It* there are two opposing concepts of space of which one is to be characterised in Löw’s terms as ‘relativistic’ and the other as ‘absolutistic’. At the beginning of Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* we are at Theseus’ court, which represents the space of law – a male space, in which men dominate women. Hermia’s father Egeus accuses Lysander to have “bewitched the bosom” (*MND* 1.1.27) of his daughter Hermia and “filched” her heart, so that she – instead of showing “obedience” —, shames him with her “stubborn harshness” (*MND* 1.1.37-38). Theseus, asked to reconstitute the fatherly power over his filial “property” reminds Hermia that according to the “ancient privilege of Athens” (*MND* 1.1.41) the
price to pay for sticking to her heart is “either die the death, or to abjure for ever the society of men” (MND 1.1.64-65). Theseus clearly embodies Athens’ law in the public space but the parallel of Theseus and Lysander wooing evokes a private sphere as well: Theseus’s wooing with “swords”, winning female love doing “injuries” (MND 1.1.16-17) is contrasted to the concept of “true love” which Lysander represents (MND 1.1.134). To keep existing norms, opposing concepts have to be negotiated and, ultimately, one has to be discarded so that legal power is sustained and the practices acting within that space are confirmed. According to Löw’s terms one could define this space as a closed space, a “Behältnisraum” which is signified by “Athens’ gate” (MND 1.1.213); within these gates Athenian law rules, which, Theseus explains, “by no means we may extenuate” (MND 1.1.120). Since a change of social practices within this urban space seems impossible, the only chance to live their love (and make a change) is to move away from that space which only gives Hermia the choice between “death or [...] a vow of single life” (MND 1.1.121) and to seek refuge at Lysander’s “widow aunt, a dowager” (MND 1.1.157) who lives “[seven leagues] away from the “sharp Athenian law” (MND 1.1.162). The spatial distance to the court already implicates a different social practice acting upon that space; furthermore the connotation of these spaces is metaphorically contrasted: Prior to Hermia beholding Athens used to be a “paradise” for her, but now it “hat hath turned a heaven unto a hell” (MND 1.1.207). Spatial practices also contrast the two women protagonists: while Hermia fights for the right to ‘write’ her own love-story, Helena, unhappily in love with Demetrius, – longs to go back to Athens (MND 3.2.3), where law regulates ‘love’ and turns it into a socially accepted and reliable practice.

The green world in contrast can be considered as a ‘relativistic space’ as it is a playing field for different social practices. It is not only the two lovers who escape to the woods, the craftsmen also meet “in the palace wood, a mile without the town” (MND 1.2.80) to rehearse their play for the Duke’s wedding. The space “at the Duke’s oak” (MND 1.2.87) is a multifunctional and ambiguous space, where the “green plot” serves as stage and a “hawthorn brake” as “tiring-house” (MND 3.1.3-5). For Bottom and his company it opens up the possibility to change their social roles (without being ridiculed like at the court) and for the lovers the wood is the space where they have the opportunity to fight for their love and verify their concepts of love beyond “Athens’ law”. For Demetrius the wood seems an “ill counsel of a desert place” (MND 2.1.218) – an empty and desolate space because Hermia is not at his side; for Helena in contrast “doth this wood [not] lack worlds of company” because Demetrius is all her world: “[...] how can it be said I am alone when all the world is here to look on me?,” she asks (MND 2.1.225-226). Unlike the space of the law, the green world allows for an exploration of varying social roles and multiple emotional states. “What have the woods to do with Athens in Midsummer Night’s Dream?,” asks Laurel Moffatt (Moffat 182). In her article she answers this question very convincingly referring to Michel Foucault’s conception of “heterotopia.” She defines the woods as “an antithesis of sorts to Athens,” functioning as a heterotopic space which in Foucault’s words is “a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites that [...] can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted” (Moffat 182). At the end of the play love and order are restored not only on the dramatic level, but the
play installs a “restitution of order that extends beyond the woods to Athens and results in a various discoria concors” (Moffat 185) that also affects the audience (Moffat 183).

Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* is (topologically) similarly structured: Orlando considers the house of his brother Oliver as “no place […] but a butchery” (*AYL* 2.3.27) and the court of Duke Frederick is described as a place of hate and rage which expresses itself in banishment (*AYL* 1.1.79-83). The Forest of Arden, in contrast, is marked as a place where “they live like the old Robin Hood of England” (*AYL* 1.1.102), and “fleat the time carelessly as they did in the golden world” (*AYL* 2.1.95). This place is characterised as a “desert city” (*AYL* 2.1.24), where “all things” are thought to be “savage” (*AYL* 2.7.107), leaving more space for individuality than the court with its strict regulations of the court:

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DUKE SENIOR. Hath not old custom made this life more sweet
Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods
More free from peril than the envious court?
Here feel we not the penalty of Adam,
The seasons’s difference, as the icy fang
And churlish chiding of the winter’s wind –
Which when it bites and blows upon my body
Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say
‘This is no flattery – these are counsellors
That feelingly persuade me what I am.’
Sweet are the uses of adversity
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head,
And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything. (*AYL* 2.1.2-17)
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Even if A. Stuart Daley argues convincingly against a “constant antithesis between Court and Country,” founding his argumentation on the “thematic unity [of] a work of art” so that the “antithesis between Court and Country has no relevance” (301), I would like to join in the “critical consensus” that the court and the forest are juxtaposed (300). Similar to the wood in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, the Forest of Arden is contrasted with the court. Celia, who decides to join the banishment of her beloved cousin, explains: “Now go we in content, / To liberty, and not to banishment” (*AYL* 1.3.127-128). And as the forest speaks a different language (‘tongues in trees’, ‘books in the brooks’), it offers different concepts of living. Insofar, the Forest of Arden is a ‘relativistic’ space, a space in which all social conflicts are resolved in the end: “Let us do those ends / That here were well begun and well begot!” (*AYL* 5.4.154-155). As in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* all lovers negotiate the ‘courtly’ problems successfully within the ‘relativistic space’ and the imminent tragedy is thus turned into a comedy. The four lovers have overcome all obstacles and can finally live their love openly while Duke Frederick is “converted / Both from his enterprise and from the world”, decides to stay in the wood and to leave behind the “pompus court” (*AYL* 5.4.166), bequeathing “the crown to his banished brother, / And all their lands restored
to them again [...]” (AYL 5.4.147). Apparently, the wood has had a significant effect and impact on the courtly society.

**Conclusion**

Returning to the Situationists International and their intention to change power structures by changing everyday social practices in space, let me once more point to the parallels between Shakespeare’s spatial dramatic structures and the geographical intervention, the détourment and dérive, as envisaged by the SI. Both Shakespeare and the SI instigated taking a critical perspective on recurrent structures of society and public space by revealing social power structures in ‘absolutistic’ spaces. Shakespeare opposes an ‘absolutistic’ space (the court/male space of the law) and a ‘relativistic’ space (the ‘green world’). Although the two comedies end with a generic happy ending, Shakespeare prompts his audiences to contemplate the two opposing spaces with their specific recurring power structures – comparable to the Situationists’ performative acts of dérive or psychogeography: “O Rosalind, these trees shall be my books, / And in their barks my thoughts I’ll character / That every eye which in this forest looks / Shall see thy virtue witness’d everywhere” (AYL 3.2.5-8). Orlando transforms the space by inscribing it just like Rosalynd who argues: “Why should this a desert be? / For it is unpeopled? No: / Tongues I’ll hang on every tree” (AYL 3.3.100-102). Orlando and Rosalynd are ‘situationists,’ they negotiate space by transgressing spatial borders and create new spaces within the social/urban space.

Step by step and by “continuous drifting” (Knabb 7) the residents in the forest are changing their everyday behaviour, like e.g. dressing in disguise as Rosalynd exchanges her petticoat for “doublet and hose” (AYL 2.4.5-6). Taking a man’s perspective, Rosalynd enacts a different social role. It is the non-urban spaces that make these “games” possible and give them some kind of socially revolutionary air:

> Revolution was conceived as the first freely constructed game, a collective transformation of reality in which history is seized by all its participants. Play, pleasure and participation were to be the hallmarks of a new form of social organisation appropriate to a world in which the imperatives of survival no longer legitimise relations of domination, alienation, or separation between the individual and the world. (Plant 71)

In keeping with generic conventions, Shakespeare’s happy comedies, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* and *As You Like It*, subvert these revolutionary changed situations. They restore order in the end by translating these situations back into the ‘absolutistic’ urban space. And it is in particular Shakespeare’s meta-theatrical use of the ‘play in the play’ which demasks not only theatrical space as such, but blurs the boundaries between theatrical and ‘real’ space, as the Duke Senior answers Orlando, who is searching for food for Adam: “Thou see’st we are not alone unhappy: / This wide and universal theatre / presents more woeful pageants than the scene / Wherein we play in” (AYL 2.7.136-139) and Jaques concludes “All the world’s a stage / And all the Men and women merely players [...]” (AYL 2.7.139-140).

Compared to vibrant early modern London Shakespeare’s comedies draw on two different spaces – one that is somehow evacuated from the city space and where transformations take place and the space of the city/court where the restored order is
reintegrated. The lover’s delusions can be compared to the SI’s concept of détour and drive, as they are meant to question and disrupt the order of the regulating city space and to achieve social changes by individual actions. The audience is actor and spectator at the same time dancing and ‘dreaming’ the plays’ transformations like in a “situationistic” “urban festival” and reintegrating them into the city space as the Duke Senior states: “We will begin these rites / As we do trust they’ll end, in true delights” (AYL 5.4.181-182).

Works Cited

Primary Literature


Secondary Literature


**Zusammenfassung**

SPACES OF DISCOVERY IN TWO EARLY MODERN TRAGEDIES OF REVENGE

BY

MARTIN MORAW

The first scene of Henry Chettle’s unjustly forgotten *The Tragedy of Hoffman, or Revenge for a Father* – first performed by the Lord Admiral’s Men, presumably at the Fortune playhouse around 1602 – offers a particularly striking example of the ways in which early modern playwrights exploited revenge, both in order instantly to generate dramatic conflict and as an occasion for spectacular theatrical display. The protagonist and revenger Clois Hoffman, who was driven into exile and has found shelter in a cave on the storm-swept Baltic coast, opens the play on a characteristic note of defiance. His first lines – “Hence, clouds of melancholy! / I’ll be no longer subject to your fumes” (l. 1–2) – are accompanied by the threatening sounds of thunder and flashes of lightning. While delivering his soliloquy, Hoffman strikes open a curtain at the back of the stage, thereby revealing to us the nature of the injustice he has suffered at the hands of his enemy, the Duke of Luningberg: hanging from the cave’s wall, there appear the skeletal remains of his father, a former admiral condemned to death over dubious charges of piracy. “Be silent, thou effigies of fair virtue,” Hoffman pleads while his father’s bare bones are rattling in the storm (l. 20). An iron crown still encircles the skull: at the execution of the disgraced Hans Hoffman, it had been made red-hot and placed on his head, melting his brains. Against the backdrop of more thunder and lightning, Hoffman, once again addressing the skeleton, utters the play’s programmatic lines: “I will not leave thee, until like thy self / I’ve made thy enemies” (l. 23–24). A few moments later, Hoffman will use the crown to kill the first of his many victims, the shipwrecked son of the Duke, Prince Otho, and proceed to hang the corpse beside that of his father, while confidently assuring his sidekick Lorrique as well as the audience that this is “but the prologue to the ensuing play” (l. 237).

Modern historians of Elizabethan and Jacobean performance practice tell us that the grotesque miniature theatre in Hoffman’s cave would have been set up in an area of the stage which, instead of forming a part of the main platform, was recessed into the rear wall and generally remained concealed from the audience’s view by either a door or, as in this case, a curtain. This alcove, which was used frequently and to great dramatic effect by the playwrights and acting companies of the early modern theater, was known, quite fittingly, as the discovery space. The significance of this space, 1

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1 Alan C. Dessen and Leslie Thomson count more than ninety instances in early modern drama in which the stage direction “discover” signals the sudden opening of a curtain or door, revealing a previously hidden scene. See the entry “discover” in Dessen and Thomson. For a comprehensive account of early modern playhouse architecture and staging practices see Gurr. For a detailed
will suggest in this essay, is not restricted to its immediate dramaturgical function but may in fact also be conceptualized in explicitly political terms. To demonstrate that such is indeed the case, I will advance two interrelated theses intended to shed light on the political structure of discovery, and of the uses of the discovery space, in Hoffman and a second revenge play, Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher’s *The Maid’s Tragedy*. First, I argue that moments of discovery in these revenge tragedies negotiate a particular feature of the political formation of early modernity, namely divine right sovereignty and its insistence that the king’s political authority is at once sacred in nature and secret in form. Second, I suggest that theatrical disclosure and discovery in both Hoffman and *The Maid’s Tragedy* also provide an indication that it is becoming increasingly difficult during the period to retain the secret and the sacred as axioms of political authorization without, however, pointing towards a clear alternative. My concern in this paper is thus to call attention to a number of ways in which the early modern stage, and specifically revenge tragedy as one of its most important genres, links dramatic and political form. It is perhaps worth recalling in this context that it has long become something of a critical commonplace to insist that the most famous of early modern avengers, Hamlet, represents the nascent claims of the modern subject partly through his prolonged resistance to the pressures of the archaic genre he inhabits: Hamlet, in this line of argument, is able to anticipate a modern form of consciousness despite being a revenger, rather than because of it.² The broader hypothesis that stands behind my argument about discovery and disclosure in Hoffman and *The Maid’s Tragedy* seeks to challenge this view of the genre as a historically late expression of residual feudal codes of honour and, in this specific sense, a backward-looking dramatic form: revenge tragedy, I suggest instead, gained its extraordinary popularity and significance on the Elizabethan and Jacobean stage not least because it was uniquely capable of mediating the profound restructuration of the political field that characterized the early modern period.

As the first scene of Chettle’s play already tells us, Hoffman betrays none of Hamlet’s reluctance and hesitation. In fact, in what amounts to a rebuttal of Hamlet’s famous couplet – “The time is out of joint. O cursed spite / That ever I was born to set it right!” (I.5.189–190) – he declares right at the outset: “In such a cause, / Where truth leadeth, what coward would not fight? / Ill acts move some, but mine’s a cause that’s right” (l.10–12). What sets the play in motion, then, is the revenger’s self-authorization to take action in the name of a higher right, and his identification of a particular cause with that right. Hoffman’s role, in other words, involves both placing himself above the rule of positive law, as well as realizing in action the conviction that it is indeed up to him – rather than the law, or, for that matter, anyone else – to set right the wrongs of this world and thus to mediate between the ideals of justice and truth on the one hand and the corrupt status quo on the other. This kind of extralegal position grounded in absolute right carried special political resonances during the early modern period.

² This view of Hamlet can be traced back at least as far as Goethe’s *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*. For the influential argument that revenge tragedy had already exhausted its vitality as a dramatic genre by the time Hamlet was first performed see Empson, 79 - 136.
Specifically, the avenging outlaw may be grasped as the mirror image of a certain notion of the absolute sovereign that played an important and controversial role in political thought during the same historical moment that saw revenge tragedy become increasingly popular as a dramatic genre. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, absolutist thinkers throughout Europe resolutely broke with the medieval conception of political rule as the exercise of arbitration within a complex web of feudal and religious obligations, and instead assembled a new image of the sovereign as divinely ordained lawmaker whose authority far exceeded traditional legal limitations on royal power. In Scotland, King James VI – the future James I of England – insisted in his early, vigorously absolutist political treatise *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies* (1598) that monarchy follows “the trew paterne of Diuinitie:” kings, James declares in this widely read tract, “are called Gods by the propheticall King Dauid, because they sit vpon GOD his Throne on earth, and haue the count of their administration to giue vnto him,” and not to their subjects (64). Scottish kingship, James goes on to claim, historically preceded the institution of a stable legal order. If, therefore, “the kings were the authors and makers of the Lawes, and not the Lawes of the kings” (James VI and I, 73), it necessarily followed that, to this day, “the King is aboue the law, as both the author and giuer of strength thereto” (75). Although “a good king will not onely delight to rule his subiects by the lawe, but euen will conforme himselfe in his owne actions therunto,” James continues, the sovereign nevertheless retains the right to suspend laws “vpon causes onely known to him” (75).

As King of England, James hardly softened his approach. In a speech before both houses of Parliament on March 21, 1610, James again referred to the parallel between God and kings to draw far-reaching conclusions concerning the nature and reach of his own power. “Kings,” James told the parliamentarians,

are iustly called Gods, for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of Diuine power vpon earth: For if you wil consider the Attributes to God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a King. God hath power to create, or destroy, make, or vnmake at his pleasure, to giue life, or send death, to iudge all, and to bee iudged nor accountable to none: To raise low things, and to make high things low at his pleasure, and to God are both soule and body due. And the like power haue Kings: they make and vnmake their subiects: they haue power of raising, and casting downe: of life, and of death: Iudges ouer all their subiects and in all causes, and yet accountable to none but God onely. They haue power to exalt low things, and abase high things, and make of their subiects like men at the Chesse. (181)

In the same speech, James repeatedly stressed that, in settled kingdoms, monarchs have an obligation to abide by the law. This limitation of the king’s power, however, always remains self-imposed and conditional: it applies only for as long as the king thinks that it should. In fact – again analogous to the sphere of theology – the question of the true extent of the sovereign’s power – or, in other words, the question of his ‘absolute’ prerogative that stands behind his ‘ordinary’ powers3 – cannot rightfully be posed by his subjects at all:

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3 The distinction between the king’s absolute and ordinary prerogative is analogous to the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained power (*potentia dei absoluta et ordinata*). For a detailed
I conclude then this point touching the power of Kings, with this Axiome of Diuinitie, That as to dispute what God may doe, is Blasphemie; but quid vult Deus, that Diuines may lawfully, and doe ordinarily dispute and discusse; for to dispute A Posse as Esse is both against Logicke and Diuinity: So is it sedition in Subiects, to dispute what a King may do in the height of his power.

(King James VI and I, 184)

Six years later, James again returned to the “transcendent” matter of the king’s absolute prerogative in a speech he delivered before the Star Chamber (212):

That which concernes the mysterie of the Kings power, is not lawfull to be disputed; for that is to wade into the weaknesse of Princes, and to take away the mysticall reverence, that belongs vnto them that sit in the Throne of God. [...] It is Atheisme and blasphemie to dispute what God can doe: good Christians content themselues with his will revealed in his word. So, it is presumption and high contempt in a Subiect, to dispute what a King can doe, or say that a King cannot doe this, or that; but rest in that which is the Kings revealed will in his Law. (212 - 213)

For James, passages such as these show, the king’s absolute sovereignty is and must remain an awful mystery. While subjects may rightfully concern themselves with the king’s will as it is “revealed” in his laws, it is political blasphemy to ask, or even worse, to attempt to delimit, how far his sovereign willing may reach under exceptional circumstances.

The dramatic language of discovery in the first scene of Chettle’s Hoffman, I would argue, gathers some of its extraordinary force by seizing on, and radically disarticulating, the theologico-political grammar of sovereign authority. More precisely, the drama of the revenger’s self-authorization performs an inversion upon the monarch’s absolute sovereignty not only in form – mystery becomes spectacular disclosure and display – but also in content – the sacred core of the king’s power becomes the material for grotesque play. If, on the one hand and as I have already suggested, the revenger’s outlaw position is in certain ways akin to that of the sovereign – both are a law unto themselves; both act in the name of a higher right – then their respective modes of authorization, on the other hand, are diametrically opposed. The king’s extralegal power, as we have seen, is a secret; its inscrutability is not accidental, but, on the contrary, the necessary form of its sacred content. Hoffman’s prerogative as an avenger, by contrast, is theatrical through and through and arises through disclosure: as the stage master of his own miniature theatre, he discovers to the audience what he will do at the height of his power and why. At the same time, the crowned skeleton in the discovery space anticipates Hoffman’s murderous inversion of the sacred ritual of coronation, in which the ceremony whose purpose it is to confirm the monarch’s supreme authority in all its dignity is turned into a sign of the spectacular displacement of that authority by the outlaw.

When faced with the radical skepticism about the figure of the God-king that, I believe, lies at the heart of the moment of discovery that opens Hoffman, it seems important to recall that – James’ fiery rhetoric of divine right notwithstanding – English absolutism belongs, historically speaking, to the pantheon of unsuccessful ideas. Despite the previous advances in centralization of power made by the Tudors

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discussion of this theologico-political correspondence, which, while not new, became increasingly important in constitutional arguments and state trials during James’ reign see Oakley, 323 - 346.
and the aggressiveness with which the early Stuart monarchs subsequently pushed toward an expansion of the royal prerogative, England – relative to other European powers – in fact experienced what Perry Anderson has called a “peculiarly contracted variant” of absolutist rule (113). To be sure, as Anderson points out, absolutism everywhere in Europe “was […] always doubly limited: by the persistence of traditional political bodies below it and the presence of an overarching moral law above it” (51). Yet the former limitation carried particular weight in England, where the comparatively early consolidation of royal power later proved a stumbling for its further expansion. “In effect,” as Anderson goes on to explain,

since centralized royal administration was from the start geographically and technically easier in England than elsewhere, there was proportionally less need for it to be equipped with any innovatory decretal authority, which could not be justified by inherent dangers of regional separatism or ducal anarchy. Thus while the real executive powers of English medieval kings were usually much greater than those of French monarchs, for that very reason, they never won the relative legislative autonomy enjoyed by the latter. (115)

Beset in this way by structural problems and ideological opposition, as well as lacking an adequate fiscal basis and military apparatus, English absolutism during the first half of the seventeenth century not only failed to reach the standards for the consolidation of power that it had set for itself, but was cut short by civil war and revolution within fifty years of King James’ ascension to the throne in 1603. Critics such as Jonathan Dollimore and Franco Moretti have made strong claims about the role of the public theatre, and specifically of its representations of political rule, in the ideological struggles during the decades leading up to the watershed moment of the execution of Charles I. Thus Moretti argues that there exists a direct link between what he calls the “deconsecration of sovereignty” in Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedy, and “the creation of a ‘public’ that for the first time in history assumed the right to bring a king to justice” a few decades later (42). And yet, as Moretti hastens to add, “[t]o acknowledge this profound historical significance […] is not to say that English Renaissance tragedy is a ‘Puritan’ or ‘bourgeois’ or ‘revolutionary’ cultural form” (42). Moretti’s caveat is an important one, reminding us that forms and genres can fulfill a ‘negative‘ historical task – in this case, the disarticulation of the claims of absolute sovereignty – without necessarily falling into ‘positive’ alignment with those forces, whatever we may call them, heralding the arrival of a new order. Hoffman’s death is a case in point. Like almost every other revenger on the early modern stage, he does not escape punishment for his actions, and the example of Hoffman is one in which the punishment is particularly fitting for the crime: the play ends with the spectacle, familiar by now, of the red-hot crown being lowered on his head, suggesting that the revenger’s prerogative remains entirely destructive, and thus within the limits of the ideology whose purchase it simultaneously helps to erode. The outlaw, it seems, can only wear the crown that rightfully belongs to the sovereign for so long, and only if it means his certain death.

I would like to illustrate further this last point about revenge tragedy as a genre in constant ideological tension with itself by turning to another, and very different, scene of discovery, taken from Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher’s *The Maid’s Tragedy*, which was first performed by the King’s Men at the Blackfriars Theatre (a smaller,
indoor theatre for the well-to-do) in 1611, discussed in Sarah Dustagheer’s article in this issue. In this revenge play, Evadne, one of the few female avengers on the early modern stage, eventually kills the lustful King of Rhodes (known only by his title, not by name) for subjecting her to the humiliation of keeping her as a mistress even after having forced her to marry Amintor, a nobleman of his court. In the first half of the play especially, we could not be further removed from the grisly spectacles in Hoffman’s sea shore cave: in an idealized island setting, we witness graceful conversation among courtiers and the performance of an elaborate masque, put on as part of the celebrations of Amintor and Evadne’s wedding. Yet the King’s abuse of power and sexual immoderation are soon revealed, and Amintor finds himself in a position in which the conflicting demands of loyalty to his wife and obedience to his sovereign have become impossible to reconcile. It is not surprising to find that in this Jacobean play, written and performed for a courtly audience, the latter demand should not only exert particular force, but also be articulated in language familiar to us by now. Thus, upon hearing that none other than the King is having an affair with his wife, Amintor is thrown into bewilderment, abandoning his plans for revenge:

O, thou hast named a word that wipes away
All thoughts revengeful. In that sacred name,
The King, there lies a terror. What frail man
Dares lift his hand against it? Let the gods
Speak to him when they please; till when, let us
Suffer and wait. (2.1.307–312)

Amintor’s response would have pleased King James, who had pursued the very same line of argument in favour of unconditional obedience on the part of the subject in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies:

First, it is a sure Axiome in Theologie, that euill should not be done, that good may come of it: The wickednesse therefore of the King can neuer make them that are ordained to be iudged by him, to become his Iudges. And if it be not lawfull for a priuate man to reuenge his priuate injury vpon his priuate aduersary (since God hath onely giuen the sword to the Magistrate) how much lesse is it lawfull to the people, or any part of them ... to take vpon them the use of the sword, whom to it belongs not, against the publicke Magistrate, whom to onely it belongeth. (78)

Revenge against the sovereign, both Amintor and James insist, is political blasphemy put into action. And yet, the one thing that the genre does not allow its protagonists to do, at least not for long, is to suffer and wait; and thus The Maid’s Tragedy reverses its course.

By the play’s final act, Evadne, now part of a whole ensemble of conspirators, has become desperate enough to act. Armed with a dagger, she steals into the King’s bedchamber at night and – drawing back the curtain concealing the discovery space – reveals the monarch asleep. Like Hamlet in the prayer scene, Evadne is worried that her victim will get off too lightly - “Yet I must not / Thus tamely do it as he sleeps; that were / To rock him to another world” (5.1.28-30) – and restrains him on the bed before waking him. The King commands her to stop, then pleads for mercy, but Evadne – “I am a tiger; I am anything / That knows not pitty” (5.1.67-68) – is determined finally to
get her revenge and kills him. Few would thus dispute, then, that *The Maid’s Tragedy*, and specifically the murder of the licentious King in the discovery space, offer a striking dramatization of one of the enduring internal contradictions of any absolutist theory, and of James’s radicalized version of the divine right of monarchs in particular: the doctrine endows its merely human protagonists with a sovereign power modelled after divinity, yet they inevitably fall short of the image of the God-king they originally brought into play. Walter Benjamin, although primarily concerned with the plays of the German Baroque, identifies this antithesis as one of the defining concerns of all European tragic drama of the period, or, in his terminology, of *Trauerspiel*:

Die Ebene des Schöpfungsstands, der Boden, auf dem das Trauerspiel sich abrollt, bestimmt ganz unverkennbar auch den Souverän. So hoch er über Untertan und Staat auch thront, sein Rang ist in der Schöpfungswelt beschlossen, er ist der Herr der Kreaturen, aber er bleibt Kreatur. (65-66)

Even the sovereign cannot escape his own creatureliness. For Benjamin, *Trauerspiele* turn the persistence of the resulting “Missverhältnis” (52) between divinely ordained hierarchical dignity and inescapable human corruption into plot, by dramatizing the dialectical conviction “dass im Herrscher, der hocherhabenen Kreatur, das Tier mit ungeahnten Kräften aufstehen kann” (67). And indeed, one could do worse than describe the progression from Amintor’s initial response to the King’s transgression – “In that sacred name, / The King, there lies a terror” (2.1.308-309) – to Evadne’s cursing of the king as a “monster” (5.1.106) in these terms. This disclosure, then, unfolds on the level of dramatic action, and not in the shape of a usurpation of the symbolic language of divine right sovereignty which, as I have suggested, is what occurs in the discovery scene in *Hoffman*. Both, we could say, in their own way “wade into the weaknesse of Princes” and “take away the mysticall reuerence, that belongs vnto them that sit in the Throne of God” (King James VI and I, 213). And yet *The Maid’s Tragedy* does not end here. In the aftermath of the murder in the King’s bedchamber, when the curtain has fallen again and the discovery space has once more disappeared from view, the play changes its trajectory once more. The deed has thrown the avengers into “an unknown wilderness” (5.3.148) and, one after another, they take their own lives. Monarchical rule is restored in the person of Lysippus, the King’s brother, whose concluding speech attempts to turn the play’s action into a confirmation of the very forms of political legitimation it had seemed to discredit. “May this a fair example be to me / To rule with temper!” Lysippus declares, adding that “on lustful kings / Unlooked-for sudden deaths from God are sent; / But curse is he that is their instrument” (5.3.292-295). Like *Hoffman*, it appears, *The Maid’s Tragedy* has come full circle. Yet as I have tried to show, the return to a divinely ordained hierarchical order only arrives after that order has been tested to its limits.
Works Cited

Primary Literature


Secondary Literature


Zusammenfassung

Dieser Artikel untersucht die Funktion des sogenannten discovery space in zwei englischen Rachetragedien der frühen Neuzeit, Henry Chettles *The Tragedy of Hoffman* und Francis Beaumont und John Fletchers *The Maid’s Tragedy*. Ausgangspunkt ist dabei die These, dass diese politisch bestimmt werden kann. Enthüllungsszenen in beiden Dramen, so die Argumentation, stehen in einem Zusammenhang mit einem zeitgenössischen Souveränitätsbegriff, der die absolute Autorität des Königs als ein Geheimnis und als gottgegeben betrachtet.
“AND HERE IN LONDON, WHERE I OFT HAVE BEENE”:
CONTRASTING REPRESENTATIONS OF THE EARLY MODERN
CAPITAL AT THE GLOBE AND THE BLACKFRIARS, 1599-1609

BY

SARAH DUSTAGHEER

In Francis Beaumont’s *The Knight of the Burning Pestle*, a man introduces himself and his Lady with a romantic yarn:

I am an Errant Knight that followed Armes
With speare and shield and in my tender yeares
I stricken was with Cupids fiery shaft,
And fell in love with this my Lady deer,
And stole her from her friends in Turnbull Street. (G2v)

For Londoners, watching this play’s first performance in 1607 at the Blackfriars theatre, the topographic reference of the final line ironically undercuts the starry-eyed romance of the knight’s tale. The humour of this speech relies on their knowledge of Turnbull Street as a notorious haunt for prostitutes.\(^1\) By evoking this meaningful urban locale, Beaumont comically pierces the image of a tender young knight struck by Cupid’s “fiery shaft.” Even the staccato monosyllables of “Turnbull Street” jar with the steady rhythm of his previous lines. The audience realise that this is not a knight and a lady but a local London prostitute and her customer. Beaumont’s deliberately crafted reference to Turnbull Street is a spatial punch line, which forces the audience to reassess their initial judgement of the knight. Punch lines and references which rely on the audience’s specific knowledge of their city are few and far between in Shakespeare’s work at the Globe; he rarely generates what we might term ‘London laughter.’ In this essay, I want to examine the representations of London and contrast performances by the Children of the Queen’s Revels at the Blackfriars theatre with performances by the Lord Chamberlain’s / King’s Men at the Globe between 1599 and 1609, identifying and analysing why two different portrayals of the city were seen at these two playhouses during this time.\(^2\)

*The Knight of the Burning Pestle* is one of twenty-four extant new plays written for the repertory of the Children of the Queen’s Revels and performed at the indoor playhouse, the Blackfriars, between 1600 and 1608. Five of these are set exclusively in

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\(^1\) The street was ‘famous’ for ‘illicit sex’ (cf. Gowing 145).

London: *The Dutch Courtesan* (1604), *Eastward Ho!* (1605-6), *The Fleer* (1606), *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* (1607) and *Your Five Gallants* (1607). These plays are dense with references to real London locations and characters associated with city life which had specific meanings for urban audiences. Spatial theorist Michel de Certeau suggests that the naming of place is “an articulation of a second, poetic geography on top of the geography of the literal” (105). At the Blackfriars, playwrights mapped the “poetic geography” through which early modern Londoners negotiated their rapidly developing environment. My opening example from *The Knight of the Burning Pestle* has its counterpart in Act 4, scene 1 of *Eastward Ho!*, when Chapman, Jonson and Marston transcribe the poetic geography of locations along the River Thames. Sir Petronel and a gang of dubious characters decide to sail to Virginia with hopes of untold wealth and riches. Their ship is wrecked during a storm and each character lands in a specific London location pertinent to their particular sin. Adulterous Winnie, for instance, lands at St Katherine’s dock, a place associated with prostitution and fallen women; and the penniless leader of the get-rich-quick scheme, Sir Petronel, lands at the Isle of Dogs, an area which was a “refuge for debtors” (Grantley 111). Evidently, the playwrights take real locations that cover the length of the river and use cultural meanings to create a symbolic map of the characters’ transgressions.

Playwrights at the Blackfriars were not unusual in their response to early modern London. Scholarship on the portrayal of the city in playhouses of this time demonstrates that plays which mapped and engaged with the specific details of the urban locale were prevalent (cf. Bly, Dillon, and Howard). Jean Howard, for example, argues that the theatre “was important in shaping how people of the period conceptualized or made sense of this fast-changing urban milieu” (2). Similarly, Darryl Grantley points out that this drama “offered the audiences imaginative ownership of the terrain on which the theatrical narratives were being played out, but in the process would have also affected and helped shape their perceptions of their actual habitat” (7). However, when we turn to consider the representation of London at the Globe at this time, there is a curious absence of any urban mapping. Here Shakespeare and several other playwrights writing for the Globe creatively responded to the city in a different way from playwrights at the Blackfriars.

Of the twenty-six extant plays performed at the Globe between 1599 and 1609, only Jonson’s *Every Man Out of His Humour* and an anonymous play entitled *The London

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3 This essay derives from a wider research project which investigates the relationship between theatre space and performance at the Globe and Blackfriars between 1599 and 1613. In 1609, the King’s Men, began performing at both these very different theatres. Before this time, the King’s Men solely used the Globe, an amphitheatre on the Southbank, which they built in 1599, while a company of boy actors called the Children of the Queen’s Revels performed in the Blackfriars, an indoor hall situated near the heart of the City of London, from 1600 to 1608. By comparing the repertoires of these two companies and their use of theatre space between 1599 and 1609 – the adult actors outdoors and the boy actors playing indoors – I aim to identify the opportunities and difficulties facing the King’s Men in 1609 when they began performing at both the Globe and Blackfriars. For a discussion of the King’s Men’s representation of urban space at the Blackfriars after 1609 see Dustagheer.

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Prodigal (occasionally attributed to Shakespeare) are set exclusively in London. Grantley notes that this second play “goes so far as to include the city’s name in its title [but] makes little of its geography beyond a few references” (139). The Miseries of Enforced Marriage, The Fair Maid of Bristol and Thomas Lord Cromwell, three other plays from the Globe repertory, are partially set in London. Nevertheless, as with The London Prodigal, these plays have significantly fewer depictions of specific city places than is normal for the repertory of the Blackfriars. The title of this essay, “[H]ere in London where I oft have beene,” is one such example of the fleeting and generalised reference to the city typical of the Globe repertory from Thomas Lord Cromwell. Aside from Jonson’s Every Man Out, at the Globe, audiences did not see an interrogation of the recognisable details of their city in the way that they did at the Blackfriars and, indeed, many other theatres of early modern London.

It would be wrong, however, to suggest that London was utterly absent at the Globe. The city was of course very much present at this outdoor theatre as foreign and historical settings formed substitutes or distant reflections of London; for instance, Shakespeare’s Rome in Julius Caesar and Coriolanus. Thus I wish to suggest that while at the Blackfriars, audiences saw a localised slice of city life – an imaginative map of real London locations – at the Globe they saw a distant, more obliquely reflected view of London: not a map but instead a panorama.

Panoramas of London were an early modern artistic phenomenon, and they began appearing around 1550. As historian Peter Whitfield notes, from this time the city became “in its own right, a subject of interest for artists to focus on, and to embody in both manuscript and printed images” (8). From 1550, artists conceived of the city in a new way; they created a large-scale vision, previously unseen, and established London as a legitimate artistic subject. These artists implicitly aligned England’s capital with earlier great metropolises such as Rome and Jerusalem by drawing the city in the same panoramic format. The panoramas of London, such as Wenceslaus Hollar’s 1647 “Long View,” were usually drawn from the south bank of the Thames near to where the Globe stood. From this position, artists saw the entire scope of the well-developed north bank and could depict the impressive sprawl of buildings. This position, of course, was the same one that audiences occupied when they travelled across the river to attend a show at the Globe. Versions of the view they saw as a result of their journey survive in those contemporary panoramas.

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4 The repertory includes: Julius Caesar (1599), As You Like It (1599), A Larum for London (1599), Every Man Out of His Humour (1599), Thomas Lord Cromwell (1600), The Merry Devil of Edmonton (1600), Hamlet (1601), Twelfth Night (1601), Troilus and Cressida (1602), Sejanus (1603), The Fair Maid of Bristow (1603), The London Prodigal (1603), Measure for Measure (1603), All’s Well That Ends Well (1603), Othello (1604), Volpone (1605), The Miseries of an Enforced Marriage (1606), A Yorkshire Tragedy (1606), The Revenger’s Tragedy (1606), Macbeth (1606), King Lear (1606), The Devil’s Charter (1606), Anthony and Cleopatra (1608), Timon of Athens (1607), Pericles (1608) and Coriolanus (1609). Content and dating has been constructed using Harbage, Knutson, and Gurr.

5 Examples of contemporary panoramas of the north side of the river Thames, viewed from south, include J.C Visscher’s Londinum Florentiss[i]ma Britanniae Urbs (1616), Ralph Agas’s Civitas Londinum (1633) and Wenceslaus Hollar’s “Long View” of London from Southwark (1647). For images and more details please see Foakes 19-20, 4 and 36, respectively.
At the Globe, audience members were presented with a literary and imaginary version of London as a panorama, and playwrights, including Shakespeare, explored the potential for reflection and analysis that the physical position on the Southbank initiated. In *Measure for Measure*, when it is time for the Duke to throw off his disguise he is insistent on the location for his ‘return’ and the place where he will articulate his discoveries. He writes to caretaker ruler Angelo, who has proved so immoral throughout the course of the play, demanding to meet him “A League below the Citie” (TLN 2182). The Duke reiterates the location to Isabella while disguised as the friar. As the ‘friar’ he speaks in the third person to confirm that the Duke

\[
\text{hath carried} \\
\text{Notice to Escalus and Angelo,} \\
\text{Who do prepare to meete him at the gates,} \\
\text{There to give up their power} \quad (\text{TLN 2219-22}).
\]

Just before this final scene begins Friar Peter also reminds the audience of its location, telling them that the trumpets have sounded and the “generous, and gravest Citizens / Have hent the gates” (TLN 2340-4). After receiving the Duke’s letter Angelo wonders at his request: “why meet him at the gates, and re[de]liver our authorities there?” (TLN 2276-7). In this final scene, the Duke does not state why he chooses the city gates for his revelation. We, like Angelo, may wonder about location. Why does Shakespeare place this scene outside the city gate, and include several reminders of this setting? I believe that this location gives the play’s ending a degree of spatial symbolism that would have been recognisable to the audience. The strands of the narrative resolve outside the city: Angelo’s immoral transgressions are revealed, he is forced to marry, Isabella learns her brother is not dead and the Duke removes his disguise. At this site the Duke chooses to gather all the disparate groups of characters together and initiates their reflection on the play’s events. The ending of *Measure for Measure* set outside the city gates forms a subtle response to its performance venue. The Globe, on the margins of the city, was a space in which audiences escaped from the dense urbanised northern part of London and had the opportunity to reflect on the city which they had left. In the final scene, the Duke chooses a parallel geographical position for a similar activity: at the gates of Vienna he initiates the citizens’ reflection on the play’s events and the degradation of their city.

In *Timon of Athens*, Shakespeare again represents an area specifically beyond civic boundaries as a site of personal revelation and social analysis. The debt-ridden and impoverished Timon is denied money by the Athenian state and his friends. His pecuniary difficulties, as the first half of the play portrays, are a result of his excessive generosity to the people who now deny him. An enraged Timon exits Athens and, from here, unleashes his venom against those inside the walls. He rants:

\[
\text{Let me looke backe upon thee. O thou Wall} \\
\text{That girdles in those Wolves, dive in the earth,} \\
\text{And fence not Athens.} \quad (\text{TLN 1504-6})
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6 All references to Shakespeare’s First Folio are from *The First Folio of Shakespeare*, The Norton Facsimile and follow the through line referencing (TLN).
After a tirade against different groups that constitute the city of Athens (matrons, maids, children, slaves, fools, senators), Timon concludes: “[t]he Gods confound (heare me you good Gods all) / Th’ Athenians both within and out that Wall:” (TLN 1540-1). In Measure for Measure, Shakespeare reminds the audience of the final scene’s location outside Vienna’s city gate by making several characters mention it. In Timon of Athens, as also discussed by Galena Hashhозева in this issue, Timon not only notes his position outside Athens’ city wall but directs an entire monologue at this civic boundary. I am drawing attention not so much to the ‘what’ of this scene but the ‘where’: Shakespeare, once again, foregrounds a position outside the city as the site where characters make critical, distant assessments of their society.

In the previous scene, Timon holds a dinner party for his so-called friends, angrily throws water in their faces and directs a tirade against these “[m]ost smiling, smooth, detested Parasites” (TLN 1474). His final lines reveal, though, that his anger has moved beyond his false friends: “Burne house, sinke Athens, henceforth hated be / Of Timon Man, and all Humanity!” (TLN 1484-5). Timon’s transformation from generous socialite to the misanthropic outsider – the play’s driving narrative – really begins at this moment. In the next scene outside the wall, Shakespeare highlights that Timon only achieves his critical judgement of his city by crossing its boundary. The culmination of Timon’s breakdown – the shift from specific rage directed at his personal friends to aggressive scrutiny of his society – occurs outside the walls. As in Measure for Measure, Timon pointedly ends outside the city. The disgruntled soldier Alcibiades, disgusted by the immorality of the Athenian rulers, attacks the city. In the final scene, he arrives outside and negotiates with the Athenian senators who appear “upon the wal[l]s” (TLN 2512). This stage direction probably meant that the senators appeared in the upper gallery of the stage; the tiring house wall represents the city boundary. It is likely that when Timon directs his speech at the wall, earlier in the play, the actor addressed the frons scenae. The imaginative space Shakespeare creates – civic border as back wall and stage as outside the city – is a reflection of the Globe’s London location. The entire theatre directly faced a natural border, the Thames, and a civic border, the City of London’s wall.

It is often said that every generation reinvents London, or any major metropolis, for themselves. However, the repertories performed at the Globe and Blackfriars from 1599-1609, suggest that the reinventions of one generation can be as multiple, rich and complex as London itself. The Blackfriars was immersed in the heart of the city, near the Inns of Court, the Royal Exchange and the Strand, and playwrights placed the dense, urban environment surrounding the playhouse on stage. Conversely, the Globe was outside this crowded, complex topography, on the less developed south bank of the Thames. From this space, audiences, playwrights and players looked back over the sprawling urbanscape of the North bank and saw their city as a whole and from a distance. Ultimately, though, whether it was a map (at the Blackfriars) or panorama (at the Globe) on stage, it is clear that early modern playhouses offered a space in which playwrights, audience and players gathered to contemplate their rapidly changing and developing urban environment.
Works Cited

Primary Literature


Secondary Literature

Zusammenfassung

Betrachtet man vergleichend das Repertoire am Globe und im Blackfriars Theater im Zeitraum zwischen 1599-1609, dann werden Unterschiede deutlich, die die jeweilige topographische Lage der beiden Theater spiegelt. Das Blackfriars Theater im Herzen der Stadt, in der Nähe der Advokatenstifte, der Börse und an der Hauptverkehrsader zwischen Westminster und der City gelegen, lud die Dramatiker ein, das urbane Treiben auf die Bühne zu bringen. In diesen Stücken, beispielsweise in The Knight of the Burning Pestle, bewegen sich die Figuren zwischen den Gebäuden der Stadt. Die Zuschauer sind eingeladen, mit diesen Figuren die Stadt aus wechselnden Blickwinkeln zu erkunden. Am Globe hingegen, das sich außerhalb der Stadtgrenzen an der Southbank befand, richten die Dramatiker den Blick aus der Distanz auf die Stadt. Hier spielen entscheidende Szenen, wie beispielsweise in Measure for Measure oder Timon of Athens, vor den Stadttoren. Die Präsentation der Stadt als Straßengewirr (am Blackfriars) oder als Panorama (am Globe) bildet dabei zwei Fokalisationspunkte in einem Kontinuum der Repräsentation ab. Dramatiker, Schauspieler und Zuschauer konnten diese Perspektiven spielerisch einnehmen, um so ein komplexes Vexierbild der sich rapide verändernden Metropole zu zeichnen.
CALL FOR STATEMENTS—SHAKESPEARE SEMINAR AT THE
SHAKESPEARE-TAGE 2011

Shakespeare’s (Un)fortunate Travellers:
Maritime Adventures across the Genres

From The Comedy of Errors to The Tempest Shakespearean drama is imbued with maritime adventure, drawing on the larger cultural appeal which oceanic spaces clearly held for early modern travellers. Maritime adventures both connect the homely land-locked places and potentially disrupt all man-made lines of cultural connection. Shipwreck is part of this wager, a necessary figure of the risks incurred through human efforts to shape and forge the future, frequently enacted on the stage. Plays such as The Merchant of Venice, Hamlet, Othello, Antony and Cleopatra, Pericles and, of course, The Tempest explicitly point to the dangers involved in seafaring, but the spectacle of risk also surfaces in the rhetoric of many other plays and, indeed, in many narratives and poems whenever navigation provides a repertoire of tropes. Our seminar invites contributions which look at maritime adventures in Shakespeare’s works, in Shakespeare’s sources as well as in adaptations of his plays, across different genres and media.

Plots based on maritime adventure are by no means just confined to drama, but are frequently involved in tales and travelogues. Some of the most appealing scenes in prose narratives, such as the romances by Sidney and Greene, in fact are scenarios of shipwreck and have, among others, inspired Shakespeare when writing his plays. Biblical accounts like St Paul’s shipwreck in the Acts or the tale of Jonah, too, serve as a further source of inspiration and of figurative meaning, manifest in poems such as Donne’s Hymn to Christ, at the Author’s Last Going Into Germany or in emblems such as Alciato’s Spes proxima. Evidently, a broad spectrum of cultural media and literary genres can be studied to discuss the issues here at stake.

We will address the question how maritime adventures travelled from the page to the stage and back to the page. We particularly invite contributions which consider how issues of seafaring and spectacles of shipwreck figure differently in different media and genres. What may be the problems or the merits when showing as opposed to telling maritime adventures and catastrophes? What narrative devices, what rhetorical figures and what performative strategies are in each case used to represent the vast illimitable spaces and the terrors of the sea which, strictly speaking, always exceed representation? In what ways and with which terms is this problem of representation addressed in stories, plays or poems, in specific performances or screenings?

Our seminar plans to discuss these and related questions with a panel of six papers during the annual conference of the German Shakespeare Association, Shakespeare-Tage (28 April – 1 May 2011 in Weimar, Germany), this time organised in association
the European Shakespeare Research Association (ESRA). Taking the 400th anniversary of *The Tempest* as its point of departure, the conference will engage in a number of key-note talks with “Shakespeare’s Shipwrecks: Theatres of Maritime Adventure”. As critical input for the discussion and provocation for debate, panellists are invited to give short statements (of no more than 15 minutes) presenting concrete case studies, concise examples and strong views on the topic. Please send your proposals (abstracts of 300 words) and all further questions by **15 December 2010** to the seminar convenors:

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